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THE EVOLUTION OF THE TERMINATION POLICYt
Charles F. Wilkinson*
and
Eric R. Biggs * *
Virtually all federal Indian policy can be analyzed in terms of the
tension between assimilation and separatism. Assimilationist
pressures have persistently sought to limit or extinguish altogether
the special federal-tribal relationship.' Among the most vulnerable
elements of Indians' special status have been the separate land
base, treaty rights, the governmental powers of tribes, federal
health and education programs for Indians, and the tax-exempt
status of reservation lands.
The forces behind assimilation are many and varied, for the
special status of Indians touches diverse sectors within our society.
Business interests often seek to acquire the land, timber, water,
gas, and oil on the reservations. Some fiscal conservatives wish to
trim the federal budget. Tax administrators in most western states
resent the tax-exempt status of Indian lands, while other state of-
ficials push to extend the full range of state laws onto the reserva-
tion. There are philosophical objections, based on generalized no-
tions of "reverse discrimination," to the special, separate status of
Indians in our legal system. Many self-styled supporters of Indians
believe that poverty and lack of opportunity on the reservations
can be eliminated only if Indians will leave the reservations and
move into the mainstream of American society.
The tribes, on the other hand, have consistently favored a
measured separatism. It is founded upon a reservation system
assisted by federal support and protection, but governed by In-
dian tribes free of most state and local controls. Thus Indians
themselves have fought to preserve their separate land base, to
protect their bargained-for treaty rights, and to maintain other
elements of the special federal-Indian relationship.
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to the American Indian Policy Review Commission. See STAFF OF AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY
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These opposing forces, in conflict for literally the entire life of
the Republic, have continually placed one central question before
Congress: should the measured separatism cont inue or should In-
dians be assimilated in whole or in part7 The question has been
answered in various ways by the Congresses of different eras.
The most extreme extension of assimilation was the termination
policy, which dominated Congress during the 1950's and most of
the 1960's. Termination may be defined simply as the cessation of
the federal-tribal relationship, whether that relationship was
established through treaty or otherwise.2 The thrust was to
eliminate the reservations and to turn Indian affairs over to the
states. Indians would become subject to state control without any
federal support or restrictions. Indian land would no longer be
held in trust and would be fully taxable and alienable, just like
non-Indian land in the states. Special federal health, education,
and general assistance programs for Indians would end.
Termination, a term suffering at the outset from emotion-laden
overtones,' has engendered two decades of bitter controversy in
the field of Indian affairs. It has been denounced by some as
vicious and racist,4 while championed by others as the flowering
of democracy and justice.' The arguments on either side have left
unexplored much of the middle ground of plain fact, often
preventing a clear perspective on the issues involved.
To understand the termination era, it is essential to view it in
the context of Indian policy historically, not as an isolated aberra-
tion. This article, therefore, will first examine the historical
development of assimilationist policies. Second, it will analyze the
legislative and administrative actions during the termination era
itself. The final section will assess the termination era and suggest
actions Congress might take concerning the terminated tribes.
I. The Roots of Termination in Prior Federal Indian Policy
Federal Indian policy has seldom been partisan in its origins."
The policy developed as a synthesis of the many diverse interests
affected by federal-Indian relations. The termination era of the
1950's and 1960's, for example, was not the product of one
political party or ideology.7 Rather, termination was an
outgrowth of 150 years of Indian policy preceding the termination
movement, and was simply the farthest extension of the fun-
damental theory underlying Indian policy throughout most of
those years. 8 Indeed, the termination movement's sponsors may
have been motivated by sincere concern for the welfare of the In-
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dian people." Nevertheless, most observers have concluded that
termination has failed."0 To understand that failure, it is necessary
to examine the historical precedents of the termination policy. As
will be seen, assimilationist notions have played a crucial role in
federal Indian policy from the beginning.
The Formative Years
During its early years, the United States dealt with the tribes,
usually by treaty, on a basis of relative international equality."
The idea was that tribes were indigenous governments entitled to
retain distinct land bases." Even so, the Indian Trade and Inter-
course Acts, passed from 1790 to 1834, were oriented, among
other goals, toward the "promotion of civilization and education
among the Indians, in the hope that they might be absorbed into
the general stream of American society."'3 These acts, which
regulated the fur trade and liquor traffic with the tribes, were a
cornerstone of federal Indian policy during the nation's first
half-century.'
The removal policy came to dominate Indian relations in the
1830's." Under the removal policy, Indian tribes were forced to
migrate to unused lands elsewhere in the continent to allow the
former tribal homelands to be opened to settlement and to the im-
position of state law. 6 With the removal policy, as with termina-
tion, it is clear that the Indians themselves hardly favored it. In-
dian "consent" to removal was gained largely by brute force,
bribery, corruption, and trickery. 7 Removal brought widely
documented suffering to the tribes uprooted from their ancestral
lands."8
Removal purported to provide a new land base and "a system of
internal government which shall protect [Indian] property from
invasion," but another goal was to provide for Indians a "transi-
tion from the [uncivilized] to the [civilized] state."'" Thus
removal's end (the eventual "civilization" of Indians) was
assimilationist. However, the method employed (the creation of
reservations) was separatist.
By the middle of the century, tribes were in danger of being
pushed off their reservations entirely by non-Indian settlement of
the midcontinent. The special status of tribes became increasingly
inconvenient to the newcomers,2 and unrelenting pressure was ex-
erted by westerners."' Those interests sought rapid assimilation,
especially in the form of the removal of restrictions on the transfer
of Indian lands.'
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Assimilation also came to be favored by those who sympathized
-with the tribes. By the 1880's, there were only two politically
-viable alternatives: gradual assimilation or the wholesale destruc-
tion of both Indian culture and Indian land.' What came to be
known as the assimilation, or allotment, policy resulted in part
from sentiment reacting to the second, more extreme, alternative."
Gradual assimilation, by incorporating the Indians into non-
[ndian life, would eliminate the reservations which, even in the
1880's, were becoming visible pockets of poverty; in addition,
assimilation would open up reservation land to potentially pro-
fitable economic exploitation. The rationale behind assimilation
seemed so beneficial to Indians that non-Indians often could not
understand why most Indians rejected the idea.Y The non-Indians
apparently failed to realize that basic assimilationist precepts such
as private ownership of land "tended to disintegrate Indian ethnic
groups but did little to assist them in adapting to white society or
in overcoming white racial discrimination and unregulated
profit-taking."'
The Era of Allotment andAssimilation
The major expression of assimilation in the nineteenth century
came in the General Allotment Act of 1887 (Dawes Act). 7 Large
amounts of Indian lands were divided into individual homesteads.
Supposedly "surplus" lands were then sold by the government.
After an initial 25-year trust period, allotted lands would become
taxable, and could be bought or sold. The idea was to settle the In-
dians on homesteads, introduce them to farming, and make them
members of the non-Indian society.'
Indians did not in fact adapt well to their newly designated roles
as farmers. 29 The clamor for the transfer of Indian lands to non-
Indians continued. Millions of acres of land were lost through tax
sales and sharp dealing.' Almost two-thirds of the Indian land
base passed out of Indian hands as a direct or indirect result of the
General Allotment Act; in all, the tribes relinquished some
86,000,000 acres."
Assimilation was also furthered during the 1880's by laws other
than the General Allotment Act. In Ex parte Crow Dog," the
Supreme Court held that the federal courts had no jurisdiction
over the murder of one Indian by another Indian on the reserva-
tion. Congress was outraged by the fact that there was "no
jurisdiction" and ignored the fact that the tribe had its own tradi-
tional punishment to cover such situations. Congress passed the
Major Crimes Act in 1885, an important piece of assimilationist
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legislation which imposed non-Indian laws on the tribes by exten-
ding federal jurisdiction to certain major crimes in Indian
country."
Still other measures were employed to find a solution to the "In-
dian problem." Senator Henry L. Dawes, the sponsor of the
General Allotment Act, and other legislators focused on immers-
ing the Indian in white education and culture to promote
assimilation."6 Thus education, which had long been an
assimilative tool," became central to the assimilationist thinking
of the late nineteenth century. 8
Captain R. H. Pratt was recruited to be the first superintendent
of the new Carlisle Indian Boarding School. He commented that
"a great general has said that the only good Indian is a dead
one .... I agree with the sentiment, but only in this: that all the In-
dian there is in the race should be dead. Kill the Indian in him and
save the man." '9 Such attitudes of cultural superiority led to calls
for the use of force in the schools to compel Indian acceptance of
white ways and values."0 The BIA boarding school system was ex-
panded along the lines of the Carlisle model:
The children usually were kept at boarding school for eight
years, during which time they were not permitted to see their
parents, relatives or friends. Anything Indian-dress,
language, religious practices, even outlook on life... was un-
compromisingly prohibited. Ostensibly educated, articulate
in the English language, wearing store-bought clothes, and
with their hair short and their emotionalism toned down, the
boarding school graduates were sent out either to make their
way in a White world that did not want them, or to return to
a reservation to which they were now foreign."
During this era Indians were accorded full citizenship in the ma-
jority society. Citizenship was extended by individual treaties and
acts,' 2 and finally by general legislation in the form of the Indian
Citizenship Act of 1924. '
To Indians, assimilation during the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries produced several negative results, such as the
loss of tribal land, the attenuation of tribal culture and religion,
and the weakening of the family unit." But the reservation system,
which was posited as the alternative to complete assimilation, ap-
peared to produce strong feelings of dependence and helplessness
among Indians.15 Assimilation seemed a simple and humane expe-
dient to its supporters.
The premise for assimilation, then, was that a standard of living
dramatically lower than that of average non-Indian society
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proved that the form of the less privileged Indian society, Le., the
reservation system, must be modified or eliminated. The mis-
sionizing of the frontier days was paralleled by more modern ef-
forts to persuade or force Indians to adopt Anglo culture, because
the latter lifestyle was seen as more conducive to a "successful" liv-
ing standard.6 Many viewed the persistent poverty prevalent on
Indian reservations as an indication that the reservation system
was inadequate. They ascribed the failure of federal policy to the
existence of reservations and the special legal status of the Indians
for which the Indian reservations stood. 7 These fundamental
assimilationist notions survived until the 1950's and would
become basic tenets of termination.
Only in the 1950's and 1960's was termination the official con-
gressional policy to be applied to all tribes. Nevertheless, tribes
were in fact "terminated" by Congress throughout the nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries on an individual, ad hoc basis.
Various treaties and statutes contained provisions calling for the
termination of the tribes in question; in every known instance,
however, those tribes were later restored to full federal
recognition. 8
The closest historical precedent for outright termination in-
volves the Five Civilized Tribes, the Cherokee, Choctaw,
Chickasaw, Creek, and Seminole. After their removal to
Oklahoma from ancestral lands in the Southeast, those tribes were
subjected to a series of acts and agreements from 1893 to 1906.'"
Taken together, those acts stripped the Five Civilized Tribes of
most, but not all, governmental functions: their courts were
abolished; tribal legislatures were forbidden to meet more than
one month a year; state criminal and civil jurisdiction was
imposed; all fiscal, educational, and social functions were ended
or taken over by federal agencies; and their public buildings were
ordered to be sold.' The status of those and other Oklahoma
tribes has since been altered, and in some instances improved, by a
complex set of statutes pertaining to Oklahoma.' As a result, the
Five Civilized Tribes are now federally recognized tribes, but most
of their tribal land is gone and it is doubtful that the other effects
of those termination acts will ever be wholly eliminated.
The Period of Indian Reorganization
The Indian Reorganization Act of 19342 (IRA) was an attempt
to find a new direction for Indian affairs. In addition to the loss of
some 86,000,000 acres of Indian land through the allotment
policy, educational and economic efforts had brought "the
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disorganization and disruption of Indian life and the demoraliza-
tion of Indian character and personality.""3 The IRA reversed the
thrust of the General Allotment Act by forbidding further allot-
ment of Indian land, encouraging reestablishment of tribal
organization and activities, and providing revolving loan funds,
resource conservation, and an Indian preference system for BIA
employment. '
Most of the IRA reforms had great potential. The provisions
relating to tribal government basically called for "home rule" by
the tribes. There is no question that the ending of the allotment
program, taken by itself, was a major reform, Still, shortcomings
in the IRA and in its administration kept the promise from becom-
ing a reality.' Charges of communism and antireligion plagued the
IRA, multiplying as the war years developed the "America First"
philosophy."7 This conclusion is typical: "The general health,
welfare, and educational level of Indians improved during the
[IRA] period, but, for the most part, Indian economic conditions
were not improved enough to reach even minimal standards of the
white population."
In spite of its partial reliance on self-government, even the IRA
was founded on assimilationist premises. The IRA was a middle
ground between full termination (Le., rapid assimilation) and full
recognition of Indian tribes as permanent, essentially separate in-
stitutions. The IRA called for the strengthening of tribal political
and economic institutions but only as necessary preparatory steps
for assimilation in the future. In the long run, this "economic
autonomy" approach would lead to inclusion of tribes in the state
jurisdictional system, on the order of municipalities or county
governments. 9 Ultimately, then, the IRA was based on the
assimilationist notion that it would "attempt to assimilate the In-
dian by letting him use his own culture as a springboard
for... integration."'
The Immediate Prelude to Termination
CongressionalActivity
Termination was not to become official policy until 1953. The
clear movement in that direction, however, began in the mid-
1940's when reaction against the IRA reform efforts became in-
tense.
The Senate's Survey of Conditions of the Indians of the United
States ended in 1943 after fifteen years of investigation. Par-
ticipating senators were deeply critical of the IRA and BIA. 6'1 A
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House investigation was launched in 1944.2 Both sides of Con-
gress criticized the administrative cost of the IRA policy and its
slow rate of progress toward ultimate assimilation. Commissioner
Jiohn Collier, since 1933 the main advocate of the IRA, resigned in
1945.6
In April and May, 1947, the Indian Affairs Subcommittee of the
House Committee on Public Lands held hearings on bills to
"emancipate" Indians from BIA control." Similar hearings,
although less comprehensive in scope, had taken place the year
before in both houses of Congress."
Also in 1947, the Senate Civil Service Committee directed
Acting Commissioner Zimmerman to testify concerning the
elimination of BIA services.' He identified tribes for which future
BIA services could be eliminated in the context of a general reduc-
tion of the federal work force.67 Zimmerman then specified four
criteria for Congress to consider in implementing such a reduc-
tion: (1) degree of acculturation; (2) economic resources and con-
dition of the tribe; (3) willingness of the tribe to be relieved of
federal control; and (4) willingness of the state to assume
jurisdiction."
Although Zimmerman protested against taking his remarks out
of context, 9 these criteria were later articulated as indicators of
various tribes' readiness for termination."° However, some of those
tribes and bands, such as the Turtle Mountain Chippewa, clearly
did not meet the minimum standards of Zimmerman's criteria"
and were deleted from termination legislation. Other bands were
found ready for termination despite noncompliance with the same
standards.73 This pattern of uneven application of the criteria was
also reflected at hearings on a bill for "liquidation" of the Klamath
Tribe.'
By early 1948, congressional pressure '5 caused Zimmerman to
direct the development of reservation programs oriented toward
"the eventual discharge of the Federal Government's
obligation.., at the earliest possible date compatible with the
government's trusteeship responsibility."'l This plan was based on
criteria for similar programs reluctantly formulated by Commis-
sioner Collier after congressional prodding in 1943.7
Various proposals to repeal the Indian Reorganization Act"0 and
for "emancipation""9 of Indians from the federal trust relationship
were advanced in the post-war years. The purpose behind the pro-
posals was a familiar one: "[Bleneath all of the rhetoric.., both
repeal and emancipation proposals were designed primarily to
release Indian land from federal trust, much as the Dawes Act of
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1887 had done."' Controversy over these proposals delayed con-
crete action until the 1950's.
In 1949, the Hoover Commission issued its Report on Indian
Affairs, calling for "complete integration" of Indians "into the
mass of the population as full, tax-paying citizens."" Three
dissents, led by that of Vice-Chairman Dean Acheson, objected to
the Commission's recommendation for rapid assimilation on the
basis of existing data."
There were scattered instances of progressive, nonassimila-
tionist programs during the late 1940's and early 1950's. An
unusually severe winter in 1947 brought widespread starvation
and national attention to the Navajo and Hopi reservations.' The
Navajo-Hopi Act, introduced in 1948, was passed and im-
plemented in 1950." However, programs initiated under this Act
and other BIA policies focused on integration and relocation of In-
dians, not reservation development, in the pretermination and ter-
mination years."
Administrative Action
During the pretermination years, the BIA was a highly impor-
tant force in the movement toward an extreme assimilationist
policy. Dillon S. Myer, former director of the highly controversial
War Relocation Authority, the detention camp program for
Japanese-Americans during World War II, became BIA Commis-
sioner in 1950." He vigorously pursued the Hoover Commission's
basic recommendation of "complete integration."'" In 1951, he
defined long-range BIA goals as (1) improvement of Indian stan-
dards of living, and (2) "step by step transfer of Indian Bureau
functions" away from the BIA." These objectives were to be ac-
complished through "citizenship participation" for individual In-
dians and "redefinition of the status" of Indians by termination of
the federal trusteeship and tribalism itself." It was suggested that
the BIA might thus induce the "cooperation of persons of Indian
descent" in "the present-day economic development of this
country.""
The BIA emphasized the Voluntary Relocation Program"1 begin-
ning in 1951-52. The goal of the Relocation Program was to en-
courage and assist "surplus" reservation residents, if they were
employable,'2 to move to urban areas from the reservations. The
assumption was that the reservations provided inadequate land
bases for the support of the populations.93
Most Indians came to view relocation as another device, not
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always voluntary," to move Indians toward termination.'3 Many
Indians who left on relocation returned to the reservation before
long.9
Still, large-scale relocation was pressed during the early 1950's
to "integrate [Indians] as quickly as we can" in permanent, off-
reservation locations.97 Senator Arthur Watkins noted that unless
the relocations were permament, rather than only seasonal, the In-
dians would "be in difficulty all of the time."9' Watkins then went
on to remark that "there are some 14,000 to 16,000 [Navajos] who
are now without schools .... In order to get the Navahos to the
point of where they can take care of themselves, we must step up
the educational activities."" Then BIA Commissioner Emmons
promised to do so, saying, "the only way we can hurry this thing
along is to push the process of integration, education and
health... to accelerate the program of preparing these Indians to
fend for themselves. ,110
The out-migration from the reservations facilitated further loss
of Indian land. In spite of tribal wishes, reservation land was
opened for sale and lease as tribal members went on relocation.'
It is difficult to say whether Commissioner Myer affirmatively
favored the Indians' loss of land. At any rate, Myer "did not ad-
vocate protecting the existing Indian lands.""0 2
To Myer's credit, "he was responsible for a general 'tightening
up' in administration."' ' In retrospect, however, the facts general-
ly support a conclusion that many of the new programs were more
counterproductive than useful; others were only partially suc-
cessful; some were of dubious legality.' In 1952, a large
newspaper discovered apparently fraudulent behavior by Bureau
officials involved in an Indian land sale.'" Alleged corruption was
anything but new in the BIA,'0 however, and it was seen by Con-
gress as yet another reason to terminate federal supervision."
In the early 1950's, decision-making authority was centralized
in five newly created Area Offices, thereby weakening local agen-
cy control." This increased the power of the national BIA leader-
ship, to which the area hierarchy was responsible."
Tribal consent to administrative decisions came to be con-
sidered unnecessary;" ° BIA programs would "proceed though In-
dian cooperation may be lacking in certain cases.."" The "stability
of the administrative process" was given "greater weight" than
"some important interest of the tribe."'"2 The Departmental Board
of Appeals, which reviewed BIA decisions, fell into disuse, and the
Interior Secretary's Indian Advisory Committee was not
consulted."'
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In 1952, House Resolution 698 requested a complete report con-
cerning BIA functions, Indian affairs, and "legislative
proposals.., to promote the earliest practicable termination of all
federal supervision and control over Indians...... This study was
continued by House Resolution 89 the next year."5 The resulting
reports by the Myer administration and the House Subcommittee
laid a foundation for the termination bills to follow. The hurried
studies were based on the similar Zimmerman undertakings of
1948,116 although results were often contradictory. 7 The four
criteria listed by Zimmerman to aid in determining the readiness
of tribes for termination were expressly rejected because those
criteria implied the continued existence of a tribal unit."8 The at-
titude expressed in the second report to Congress was that such
continuation of tribalism might serve to hinder the process of ter-
mination. The change of emphasis from the IRA was now com-
plete, from long-range assimilation to short-term and total
termination.' 9
In a sense, then, Indian policy was not truly changing directions
when the termination era began. It was merely accelerating the
long contemplated process of assimilation. The acceleration,
however, was so rapid that it can best be characterized as a radical
innovation.
II. The Termination Era
The termination era of the 1950's and 1960's is often thought to
consist of House Concurrent Resolution 108, which announced
the general policy of termination, and a series of individual ter-
mination acts terminating the federal-tribe relationship with
specific tribes.'" While those congressional actions made an indeli-
ble mark on Indian affairs, the termination era went much further.
The termination era produced a comprehensive program, in-
terweaving individual termination acts with many other congres-
sional statutes and BIA policies. In addition to the acts terminating
specific tribes, the total termination program included the follow-
ing federal action: the transfer of civil and criminal jurisdiction
over Indians from the tribes and the federal government to the
states under Public Law 280; the transfer of many educational
responsibilities from the tribes and the federal government to the
states; other educational policies to promote assimilation; the
transfer of Indian Health Service responsibilities from the BIA to
the Department of Health, Education and Welfare; the authoriza-
tion for sale and lease of restricted Indian lands to non-Indians;
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legislative and administrative inaction regarding reservation
economic development; and continued relocation programs to en-
courage Indian migration from the reservations to urban areas.
Thus seen, termination amounted to a truly fundamental social
restructuring.
House Concurrent Resolution 108
The keystone piece of legislation was House Concurrent Resolu-
tion 108 (HCR 108), passed on August 1, 1953. HCR 108 declared
termination to be official congressional policy and called for ter-
mination to be implemented with regard to individual tribes "at
the earliest possible time." The full text of this signal statement of
congressional purpose is as follows:
Whereas it is the policy of Congress, as rapidly as possible to
make the Indians within the territorial limits of the United
States subject to the same laws and entitled to the same
privileges and responsibilities as are applicable to other
citizens of the United States, and to grant them all the rights
and prerogatives pertaining to American citizenship; and
Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate
Concurring), That it is declared to be the sense of Congress
that, at the earliest possible time, all of the Indian tribes and
the individual members thereof located within the States of
California, Florida, New York, and Texas, and all of the
following named Indian tribes and individual members
thereof, should be freed from Federal supervision and control
and from all disabilities and limitations specially applicable
to Indians: The Flathead Tribe of Montana, the Klamath
Tribe of Oregon, the Menominee Tribe of Wisconsin, the
Potowatamie Tribe of Kansas and Nebraska, and those
members of the Chippewa Tribe who are on the Turtle
Mountain Reservation, North Dakota. It is further declared
to be the sense of Congress that the Secretary of the Interior
should examine all existing legislation dealing with such In-
dians, and treaties between the Government of the United
States and each such tribe, and report to Congress at the
earliest practicable date, but not later than January 1, 1954,
his recommendations for such legislation as, in his judgment,
may be necessary to accomplish the purposes of this
resolution. '
Legally, a concurrent resolution is a general policy statement
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only and does not have even that limited effect on any future
Congress.2 Thus, technically HCR 108 had no further validity
after the Eighty-third Congress adjourned in early 1955. Never-
theless, some commentators continue to emphasize that it has
never been repealed even though no "repeal" is necessary because
its legal effect is already spent." Indians feel the political pressure
still generated by HCR 108 and continue to urge that Congress
adopt a statement disapproving it.14
The Individual Termination Acts and Plans
Since HCR 108 was a statement of policy only, individual acts
were needed to implement the policy in regard to specific tribes.
The following table shows the individual acts in chronological
order.
Number Acres State
Menominee
Klamath
Western Oregon*
Alabama-Coushatta
Mixed-Blood Utes
Southern Paiute
Lower Lake
Rancheria
Peoria
Ottawa
Coyote Valley Ranch
California Rancheria
Act**
Catawba
Ponca
Wyandotte
3270
2133
2081
450
490
232
unk.
unk.
630
unk.
1107
631
442
984
233,881
862,662
2,158
3,200
211,430
42,839
unk.
unk.
0
unk.
4,317
834
834
94
Wisc.
Ore.
Ore.
Tex.
Utah
Utah
Cal.
Okla.
Okla.
Cal.
Cal.
S.C.
Neb.
Okla.
Authorizing
Statute (date)
68 Stat. 250 (1954)
68 Stat. 718 (1954)
68 Stat. 724 (1954)
68 Stat. 768 (1954)
68 Stat. 868 (1954)
68 Stat. 1099 (1954)
70 Stat. 58 (1956)
70 Stat. 937 (1956)
70 Stat. 963 (1957)
71 Stat. 283 (1957)
72 Stat. 619 (1958)
73 Stat. 502 (1959)
76 Stat. 429 (1962)
70 Stat. 893 (1956)
Effective
Date
1961
1961
1956
1955
1961
1957
1956
1959
1959
1957
1961-70
1962
1966
1959
*61 tribes and bands. Figures listed are aggregates.
*37 to 38 rancherias. Figures listed are aggregates.
This means that approximately 109 tribes and bands were ter-
minated. A minimum of 1,362,155 acres and 11,466 individuals
were affected. Statistics on Indian population are notoriously in-
accurate, but no more than 3 per cent of all federally recognized
Indians were involved." The total amount of Indian trust land
was diminished by about 3.2 per cent."6
After an individual termination act was passed, a third step was
required before termination finally took effect. Each act directed
Group
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the Secretary of Interior to develop a detailed termination plan for
the tribe. Usually the difficult questions in the plans revolved
around the transfer of land from trust status into private owner-
ship. As is seen from the above chart, plans were often completed
for the smaller tribes within a year or two after the individual acts
-were passed. The three tribes with the largest land holdings- the
Menominee, the Klamaths, and the mixed-blood Utes-all had
plans with lengthy provisions for complicated trusts or private
corporations. The Menominee plan, for example, was enormously
complex: it was 30 pages long (miniscule type, three columns to a
page) in the Federal Register."' Those three plans were not made
final until 1961, seven years after the individual acts were passed.
The effects of the termination program can be best appreciated
by analyzing these individual acts and plans. Those documents
were very different from the glossy euphemisms used by Congress
to describe termination: it was purportedly a program to "free" In-
dians from federal supervision and to eliminate "restrictions
deemed discriminatory" against Indians. '" In fact, termination did
little to promote "freedom" or to root out "discrimination." Ter-
mination ended the special federal-tribal relationship almost com-
pletely and transferred almost all responsibilities for, and powers
over, affected Indians from the federal government to the states.'2
The historic special Indian status came to an abrupt end for ter-
rinated individual Indians and tribes.
More specifically, these basic elements were common to all of
the individual congressional acts and administrative plans:
1. Fundamental changes in land ownership patterns were made.
For most of the smaller tribes, all land was simply appraised and
sold to the highest bidder, with the proceeds going to the tribe.'
For the Klamaths, members were given a choice between im-
mediate payment and participation in a private trust. Most
Klamaths chose immediate sale and 600,000 acres were sold in
1961.'"' Most of the remaining private trust land has also now been
sold.' 2 For the mixed-blood Utes and the Menominee, state cor-
porations were established."3 The Ute land has now been sold. The
Menominee land is now back in trust, as a result of the tribe's
restoration in 1973, but 9,500 acres were sold in the 1960's to pay
corporate bills.'3'
2. The trust relationship was ended. This means that federal ex-
pertise would be unavailable for land and resource management.
There would no longer be federal protections against the sale of
land.'33
3. State legislative jurisdiction was imposed. With few excep-
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol5/iss1/4
tions, on federally recognized reservations only tribal councils and
Congress have power to pass laws.136 After termination, state
legislatures and county boards would have broad authority over
such basic matters as education, adoptions, alcoholism, land use,
and other fundamental areas of social and economic concern.
4. State judicial authority was imposed. On federally recogniz-
ed reservations, except for so-called "Public Law 280" reserva-
tions, federal and tribal courts hear almost all cases; state courts
have extremely limited jurisdiction. 3 After termination, all
criminal and civil cases went to state court. The imposition of
state legislative and judicial authority is an especially crucial fac-
tor. Indians have argued for federal and tribal authority over
reservation Indians because of long-standing discriminatory prac-
tices by local officials. Reliable authorities indicate that those
claims of local hostility are warranted." Termination took away
the buffer of federal and tribal law.
5. All exemptions from state taxing authority were ended. The
power to tax is part of the state's legislative jurisdiction, discussed
above, but is so important that it deserves to be treated separately.
Indian tribes and individuals enjoy almost total immunity from
state tax laws when in Indian country, which usually means
within the boundaries of a federally recognized reservation.'3 The
states do not suffer financially-the federal government provides
substantial in lieu payments to compensate for the lost tax
revenue. "' That immunity, which often resulted from federal
treaties and meant much to Indian tribes and individuals, was
abolished by termination.
6. All special federal programs to tribes were discontinued.
There are an increasing number of federal programs available only
to federally recognized tribes. They include training, housing,
recreation, and business grants and contracts."'
7. All special federal programs to individuals were
discontinued. These substantial programs provide members of
federally recognized tribes much-needed health, education, and
welfare assistance."2 These programs, like the tribal programs, are
available only to federally recognized Indians, not to the general
non-Indian population. Neither are they available to terminated
tribes and individuals.
8. Tribal sovereignty was effectively ended. Indian tribes have
inherent sovereignty"' and nothing in the termination acts express-
ly extinguished that governmental authority. Nevertheless, the
loss of the land base meant that in most cases the tribe had no
geographic area over which to exert jurisdiction. Regardless of the
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fact that terminated tribes probably retain their status as sovereign
governments, the practical reality is that, with one exception, no
terminated tribe has continued to make laws or to maintain tribal
courts to enforce any laws after termination."' Thus the ter-
minated tribes were effectively stripped of their broad powers to
act as governments. Tribal sovereignty, more than any single legal
doctrine, has contributed to the exciting developments on Indian
reservations in the 1970's; one writer has aptly described tribal
sovereignty as a "cornucopia '" - but not for terminated tribes.
In return, individual tribal members received a check for the
value of their land. In most instances, the payments amounted to
little, although the withdrawing Klamaths received payments of
$43,000 in 1961.46 The check did not compensate for the loss of
Federal benefits or the new tax burdens. It could not pay for the
loss of tribal governmental authority, or compensate for the
discrimination that followed in the state agencies and courts.
Perhaps most tragic of all, the check could not possibly pay for the
psychological costs of "not being an Indian any more. "17
Congressional Leadership for Termination
Termination was one of the most significant doctrines in the
history of federal Indian policy. Yet the congressional resolution
declaring termination to be federal policy was passed without con-
troversy and nearly without comment.4" The few congressmen
still in favor of maintaining the special federal-tribal relationship
apparently were unaware of the scope of HCR 108 or the rapidity
with which it was to be implemented. "' Moreover, "termination
seemed inevitable at a time when pluralism of any kind was
suspect" and when "an intellectual vacuum on Indian policy" had
therefore developed among nonterminationists; lacking a real
alternative to termination, they acquiesced in the basic concept,
although they did not support it.'w The only suggestion, other
than objections to provisions in specific bills, was that tribal con-
sent be required before termination occurred.''
Another reason for this near unanimous response to the confus-
ing and complex field of Indian relations was the prevailing mood
in Washington, D.C., in the early 1950's. President Eisenhower
warned that "those who would stay free must stand eternal watch
against excessive concentration of power in government."' 52
Viewed in this perspective, some congressmen felt that "there is
something un-American about the idea of reservations" and BIA
trusteeship over them.' Thus 1953 brought "an extensive Con-
gressional effort to reduce the involvement of the federal govern-
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ment in Indian affairs," and to "free" the Indian people from
federal control."M
The termination legislation was dominated by the work of a
small number of congressmen. Although less the case today, in the
1950's Indian policy was a backwater area considered "unimpor-
tant" by most legislators." The few men holding strong views on
Indian affairs were able to shape basic policy almost singlehanded-
ly.
The organizational structure of the two Houses also lent itself to
domination by a few members. Impetus for HCR 108 and the in-
dividual termination bills centered in the Indian Affairs subcom-
mittees of the Senate and House Interior Committees." Both com-
mittees have been traditionally composed of members from the
western states,5 7 where the great majority of federal land is found.
Politicians from these states are subject to pressures both from
non-Indian majorities and special interests advocating parks,
dams, and development projects.' 8 Those pressures often con-
flicted with the preservation of tribal holdings in the post-war
period; the prevailing atmosphere was one of energetic exploita-
tion of natural resources. '
Partly because a sense of commitment dominated the subcom-
mittee leadership,'" the influence of the subcommittees became
substantial in the full committees and in Congress, where most
members were preoccupied with other matters. Congress seemed
willing to pass any Indian legislation that was favorably reported
out of the subcommittees in order to accomplish reform.'6'
Representative Berry of South Dakota was chairman of the
House Indian Affairs Subcommittee. He apparently had a strong
pro-business orientation.6 ' With only two years' experience in
Congress, he often yielded to the more experienced and dynamic
chairman of the Senate subcommittee.'1
Arthur V. Watkins of Utah was the single most important
legislator during the termination era. Beginning his second term in
the Senate, he was the chairman of the Indian Affairs
Subcommittee.'" Senator Watkins wielded the power at hand
determinedly. Watkins alone of the five Senate members was pre-
sent for more than one of the joint termination hearings. The
typical hearing was attended by Watkins, Berry, another subcom-
mittee member from the House, and Watkins' staff assistant; thus,
"Watkins had little difficulty in dominating the hearings."'"
Senator Watkins had long favored the policy of termination,'"
but he began to turn his most direct attention to the issue when the
Eighty-third Congress convened. He met with Representative
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William H. Harrison of Wyoming and Orme Lewis, Assistant
Secretary of the Interior Department, on February 27, 1953, to
map out and coordinate termination policy, tactics, and actions. 
7
A four-point policy resulted:
(1) Rapid termination of federal administrative responsibility
For tribes. This was to be accomplished by:
(a) Transfer of services to "proper public bodies of the political
subdivisions."
(b) Distribution of tribal assets to tribes as groups or to in-
dividual members.
(c) Transfer of trust responsibility for Indian land to Indian in-
dividuals or groups.
(2) Pro rata disbursement of tribal income with set-offs for "a
fair share of the cost of... services."
(3) Rehabilitation legislation.
(4) Prompt Interior Department action on termination bills
under consideration.'"
The fundamental Indian policy of the termination era was thus
in large part "instituted... with no pretence of consultation with
Indians."'" Six months later, the passage of HCR 108 allowed
Watkins to set about the active pursuit of terminationist goals.'"
Senator Watkins wished quickly to establish a precedent by the
enactment of termination legislation in order to set a policy for the
future.'"
Senator Watkins saw termination as a great liberating force,"'
comparing it to the Emancipation Proclamation.' 3 He was deeply
convinced of the correctness of his policy and did not hesitate to
use pressure when he thought it wise, including the withholding of
tribal funds to force agreement to termination plans."
Perhaps because he felt tribal assent to be superfluous,', Senator
Watkins also resorted to other tactics in the drive toward termina-
tion. He gave witnesses misleading assurances" and erroneous
information"' concerning the intent of Congress. Watkins asked
leading questions of accommodating BIA witnesses to create an
optimistic picture of Indian competency for termination."' On the
other hand, Watkins was critical and incredulous when tribal
members or senators spoke against termination."" Watkins' ap-
parently unbending faith in the justice of his cause" probably ac-
counted for the discrepancy between the idealistic ends he
professed and the very pragmatic means he used."'
There was some opposition by congressmen to the general con-
cept of termination, as expressed in specific bills. Senators
Mansfield, Smathers, Young, and Proxmire saw flaws in the ter-
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mination policy, as it was set out in bills to terminate the
Seminole, Turtle Mountain Chippewa, Menominee, and other
tribes. "' Representative Dowdy of Texas objected to the Alabama-
Coushatta termination bill.' Melvin Laird, whose district includ-.
ed the Menominee Tribe, also voiced opposition to termination,
to no avail.'" This scattered opposition had little effect.
Due to all of these factors, the termination programs moved
ahead "with great rapidity.""' For example, Public Law 280" was
"passed at the end of the session and sent ... to the President,
allowing virtually no time for revision.""' Its accompanying
report "was so hastily submitted that it had not been cleared with
the Bureau of the Budget, which meant that President Eisenhower
had not known about the amended bill before he was asked to sign
it."' Eisenhower did sign the bill into law, but asked that Con-
gress amend it to provide for "consultation" with the Indians."9
This action was not taken during the termination years."' Thus, it
is fair to say that "Congress rushed the whole process so much that
systematic study and preparation had not been given to the
legislation by Congress, the [BIA], or the tribal councils."'..
BIA officials showed "firm commitment to the basic policy" of
termination throughout the hearings called for by HCR 108. "
Although tribal consent was not considered necessary, ques-
tionable tactics were sometimes used to obtain tribal acceptance of
termination. It has been suggested that the Bureau refused to
recommend congressional distribution of a $2,600,000 judgment
to the Western Oregon Indians unless they agreed to the termina-
tion principle; at the very least, there seemed to be direct relation
between "slowness in getting funds distributed" and tribal at-
titudes "about this [termination] legislation."'"
During the 1954 Joint Hearings on Termination, Commissioner
Emmons was asked by Representative Berry whether Emmons had
"contacted the Indian tribes themselves to get their consent on all
these [termination] bills."'9' Emmons replied that his contacts had
been "for discussion purposes. The consent was, of course, not
obtained."' 5 Earlier he said that his policy would be "to get the
consent and to let [Indians] know what is expected and so forth."'96
Later, commenting on the planned removal of Indian property
from federal trust in termination proposals,"' Emmons mentioned
that he thought "they are going to feel all right about it if we could
do two or three little things which they want to have done,"''
referring to the removal of federal restrictions over the amounts of
wheat the Indians were allowed to grow.'"
Representative Dowdy was outraged at BIA tactics in connec-
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tion with the Alabama-Coushatta bill.2" To gain tribal agreement,
a BIA official had said the bill concerned forest management and
that no more timber would be sold unless the tribe agreed to ter-
mination. The department ignored tribal and state requests for dif-
ferent arrangements.'
Commissioner Emmons frequently mentioned four goals other
than termination that were basic to BIA programs in the 1950's:
(1) health improvement, (2) education, (3) relocation and voca-
tional training, and (4) economic development."°2 Actually, those
goals were seen by the BIA as being part and parcel of the termina-
tion process: health and education policy were both directed
toward transfer to state control, a central tenet of termination;
relocation was itself an example of extreme assimilationist policy;
and economic development was given a low priority, to be en-
couraged only if relocation efforts failed. '03 There is no question
that termination was pursued relentlessly within the BIA, to the
virtual exclusion of any inconsistent goals.'
By 1956, it was clear to many Indians that the overall effect of
termination's "hasty legislation and wide-ranging official actions"
rivaled the sweeping changes wrought by the General Allotment
Act. ' Believing that they had been deceived by the administra-
tion, most Indians developed a deep and lasting fear of
termination.'
Public Law 280 and Other Legislative andA dministrative
Programs of the Termination Era
The preceding material is a summary of the termination statutes
per se. Although that series of acts was the central force of the ter-
mination era, they were only part of the extreme assimilationist
policies dominating Congress during the 1950's and most of the
1960's. The other major programs of that era did not amount to
outright termination. Nevertheless, they embodied many of the
basic elements of the individual termination statutes.
Perhaps the major piece of assimilationist legislation during this
era, other than the termination acts themselves, was Public Law
83-280 (Public Law 280), enacted soon after the passage of HCR
108.207 In this act, Congress took the extreme-and
unprecedented" -step of passing general legislation extending
state jurisdiction to federally recognized reservations. It amounted
to many steps down the road of replacing tribal customs and laws
with local, non-Indian customs and laws.
Public Law 280 extended state criminal and civil jurisdiction to
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reservations in five (later six) states. ° The statute also allowed for
similar assumptions of jurisdiction by other states in the future. °
Rights under treaties, agreements, and statutes were expressly
protected." ' Both House and Senate reports noted the lack of law
and order on the reservations as the main motivation for imposing
state criminal jurisdiction. 12 Perhaps illogically, jurisdiction was
shifted from the tribes to the states because Indians had "reached a
stage of acculturation and development" in which they "were just
as socially advanced as other state citizens. ' 3 Nevertheless, this
paradox.. did not deter the passage of Public Law 280. The Act
may have been perceived to have advantages, such as its com-
patibility with the termination policy, ' its convenience and
economy," 6 and its supposed ability to meet state interests in
regulating reservation industries and other activities."
However, states often found Public Law 280 jurisdiction to be
neither convenient nor inexpensive,"8 with responsibilities far
outweighing added revenue. ' Financial difficulties meant inade-
quate law enforcement, ' leading to the extremes of inequitable
enforcement or none at all.71'
There was substantial Indian opposition to this assimilationist
legislation. Indian objections emphasized the lack of a tribal con-
sent provision," perhaps motivated by congressional desires for
haste" in imposing state law." Many Indians felt that tribal
sovereignty had been slighted by this omission.' In addition, they
recognized that state jurisdiction could result in practical
discrimination against Indians.'6 This concern was later shown to
be justified. 7
As was the case in earlier days,m education became a basic ele-
ment of extreme assimilationist policy during the 1950's and
1960's. The method this time would be to end most of the special
federal responsibility to educate Indian children. That respon-
sibility would be transferred to state school districts.
In 1952, all federal schools in four states-Idaho, Michigan,
Washington, and Wisconsin-were closed down by the BIA. ,9 In
1953, 19 federal boarding and day schools were closed, " and In-
dian students were transferred to state schools."' Moreover,
"federal boarding schools still in operation utilized a 'forced
assimilation' approach by educating the children far from their
homes (Navajo children in Oregon, Northwest Indians inOklahoma).'"
Assumption of state educational control was also encouraged
through the allocation of federal funds. For example, a 1953
amendment to the School Facilities Construction Act provided
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1977
construction funds for state schools attended by Indians." These
funds, however, were often diverted by the states to facilities serv-
ing non-Indian students.- Similarly, during the 1950's Congress
appropriated greatly increased funds under the Johnson-O'Malley
Act, which permitted the BIA to contract with the states for Indian
education.' Many states used Johnson-O'Malley funds for general
expenditures benefiting all students, in spite of the fact that the
monies could legally be used only for special programs for Indian
children. Those illegalities continued into the 1970's, when two
court orders and new BIA guidelines finally halted the practice in
most states. 6
The Navajo Emergency Educational Program of 1954
-established schools in trailers and quonset huts on the reservation,
and integrated older Indian children into nearby public schools .
The emergency status of educational programs derived directly
from the termination impetus: "Congress allocated funds for crash
programs to assist withdrawing tribal members in gaining the
t:raining needed to earn a living [off the reservation]
.. Unfortunately, the training was largely ineffective."2'
It is no wonder, then, that the Special Senate Subcommittee on
Indian Education concluded in 1969 that "our Nation's policies
and programs for educating American Indians are a national
tragedy."' 9 That tragedy resulted in part from the government's
use of Indian education as a terminationist tool.
20
Another aspect of the termination era was the transfer of Indian
hospitals and health facilities from the BIA to the Department of
Health, Education and Welfare (HEW). The move was motivated
by two basic premises of the termination era. First, the transfer
was justified by the desire to eliminate "laws which set Indians
apart from other citizens";241 acts repealing special limitations on
Indians concerning intoxicants124 and firearms..3 were similarly
motivated. Second, the transfer was "in line with the policy.., to
terminate duplicating and overlapping functions provided by the
Indian Bureau.. 4 ' Furthermore, federal health care for Indians had
been criticized for years and in the opinion of many it was time for
a change.45
Despite warnings from Indians,2 " health officers,"4 ' and
legislators '4 that rapid transfer of health service responsibility
could impair the already precarious state of Indian health care,
Public Law 568 was passed on August 5, 1954, providing for
transfer of Indian health responsibilities to the Public Health
Service. 20 The Secretary of HEW was authorized to contract with
states that wished to assume Indian health service duties, and to
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remove any employees from the transferred staffs who were found
"to be in excess of the personnel necessary for the administration"
of the facilities involved.' A proviso added that "hospitals now in
operation for a specific tribe or tribes of Indians shall not be closed
prior to July 1, 1956" without tribal consent.'
The accompanying Senate Report commented that recent BIA
"policy.. .has been to discontinue the operation of Indian service
hospitals where contractual service can be obtained from private
hospitals or from those which are State or locally operated." 2
Transfer to the Public Health Service, the report later mentioned,
would put the health service administration more "in a position to
know the State programs ... and determine to what extent the In-
dian is receiving the services available to him as a citizen to a
degree that could not be attained in the Indian Bureau without
needless duplication of staff and expenditures." ' 3 Thus, the focus
was apparently as critics had feared-on a reduction of federal
services, not an improvement in them.
The management of Indian lands still in trust continued to be a
significant question in the termination era. Indians charged that
BIA policy was intended to "force more of their trust lands onto
tax rolls, opening it for sale to whites while tribal governments
stood helplessly by.""5 The Indian Long-Term Leasing Act of 1955
(ILTLA) authorized Indian tribes and individuals to lease
allotments of deceased Indians for the benefit of the heirs," a pro-
vision to sidestep the effects of the General Allotment Act and
other existing laws governing leasing of Indian lands.' The thrust
of the ILTLA was to increase the productivity of Indian land, as
leased, usually to non-Indians. This purpose was implicit in Sec-
tion 2 of the Act, which authorized the Secretary of the Interior to
lease allotted lands where the allottee was deceased and the heirs
could not be completely determined or located. 9 The underlying
terminationist purpose was made express in Section 5 of the IL-
TLA, which prohibited the Secretary from approving any lease
that would "prevent or delay a termination of Federal trust
responsibilities" regarding the land involved.'
Efforts to encourage Indians to leave their reservation homes for
urban employment through relocation and employment assistance
programs were expanded radically in the early and mid-fifties.6l
While relocation initially may have appeared attractive,6' the
disparity between the euphoric BIA promises and the harsh, slum-
level realities of relocation led to Indian bitterness and despair.'
Some studies on relocation showed a high rate of return to the
reservation by relocatees in some tribes, and an absence of ac-
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1977
culturation among those who did not return.2 ' The rate of
returnism, as measured by studies critical of relocation, varied
from 60 per cent to as high as 90 per cent and even 100 per cent.'"
BIA studies in 1953, 1955, and 1956 reported returnism at 30 per
cent, 24 per cent, and 26 per cent, respectively.'
One reason for this failure was that the new relocation plan
largely placed Indians in seasonal railroad and agricultural work,
among the poorest and most insecure jobs in the nation.26 '
Moreover, BIA funds were not always available to assist the ur-
ban transplants in making the transition to a strange new life. 8 In
addition, Indians remained suspicious of relocation programs.69
Relocation was at best a mixed blessing to most Indians. °
Finally, a major element of the termination era was not an af-
firmative program at all, but a pattern of administrative and
legislative inaction in regard to programs for tribal economic
development. Although it is less true now, there was almost no
economic development on the reservations in the 1950's; the BIA
did "not encourage the tribes to develop their own [resources],
and the tribes [had] neither the expertise nor the capital to do so
alone." ' " Even such necessary beginnings as the Navajo
Rehabilitation Program were not further developed in the direc-
tion of tribal autonomy during the termination era. 2 The Indian
Point IV Program, proposed in Senate Bill 809, was not enacted
by the Eighty-fifth Congress (1956). One historian reported that:
During the 85th Congress. .. hearings were held on S.809, a
bill to provide economic assistance to the American Indians;
Senate Concurrent Resolution 3 which was to be a new state-
ment of policy by the Congress to replace House Resolution
108 ... and S.331, which would have reversed the effect of
Public Law 280 .... None of this proposed legislation was
enacted at that time. 73
The other side of the story of what did not occur during the ter-
mination years concerned the debilitating effect of the threat of
termination on nonterminated and soon-to-be-terminated tribes
alike. Progressive tribes with active development programs were
forced to shift gears and spend most of their limited resources
staving off termination. 7
III. Contemporary Responses to the Termination Policy
The Congresses of the late 1960's and 1970's have rejected the
extremes of termination and federal paternalism. Taken as a
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whole, present policy is directed toward recognizing tribes as per-
manent governmental institutions. A measured separatism, or
"self-determination," in Indian country will be assisted, but not
dominated, by federal support. In the main, tribes are viewed as
discrete governmental units largely free of state and local controls.
The focus is on methods to strengthen and expand, not to aban-
don, the special federal-tribal relationship. At this writing, the
very important final report of the American Indian Policy Review
Commission will not be complete until May, 1977, but it will
almost certainly be premised upon those notions. Although ter-
minationist attitudes persist in some quarters,27 Congress itself
seems to be moving in a very different direction.
This section will analyze the primary events which led to Con-
gress' abandonment of the termination policy and the adoption of
the "self-determination" approach.
In 1958, after five years of turmoil and bitterness, Interior
Secretary Seaton made the first official statement against termina-
tion. He declared that termination without tribal consent was
"unthinkable."'2 76 This had little immediate effect, even in Seaton's
own department: "the BIA attitude toward... termination re-
mained unchanged"2 in the late 1950's and early 1960's. In 1961,
Stewart Udall, new Secretary under the Kennedy Administration,
approved final administrative termination plans for the large ter-
minated tribes.7 However, the Kennedy Administration did de-
emphasize termination 9 and 'no new termination acts were
passed. During the Johnson years the tribes were treated with a
measure of permanency: many of the Great Society programs
were extended to the tribes.2°
One definite indication of the passing of the termination era
emerged from Indian country in the late 1960's. The Colville tribal
elections turned into a well-publicized referendum on the issue of
the potential termination of the tribe. The pro-termination slate
was roundly defeated by an anti-assimilation ticket headed by
Lucy Covington, who became tribal chairperson." 1
In 1969 Alvin M. Josephy conducted a study on Indian issues
for the incoming administration. Its first priority was a recom-
mendation that "the Administration, hopefully through the Presi-
dent himself" respect an earlier campaign promise that the ter-
mination policy would be abandoned."' Also in 1969, the Special
Senate Subcommittee on Indian Education, chaired first by
Senator Robert Kennedy and then by his brother Ted, criticized
the effects of termination on Indian education.'
In 1970, President Nixon addressed Congress and formally set
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out the Administration's Indian program.' He called for "self-
determination without termination."' In addition, he advocated
the return of the Blue Lake lands to the Taos Pueblo, the right of
Indian people to control and operate federal programs, increased
aid for economic development, improvement of Indian education,
help for urban Indians, and increased trust responsibilities of the
federal government to Indian tribes.'
In June, 1973, the Senate Subcommittee on Indian Affairs held
hearings on S. 1017, the Indian Self-Determination and Assistance
Act."' Those hearings proceeded on a strong, upbeat note of self-
determination and of an increased federal financial commitment
to the tribes.'
Perhaps the most striking indication of congressional reversal of
the termination policy, however, was the passage of the
Menominee Restoration Act of 1973." Both committee reports
noted that the Menominee faced a disastrous and probably
untenable situation after termination. Tribal land had been sold to
meet financial obligations, the tribal lumber mill was antiquated,
the tribal corporation had a serious cash flow problem, and basic
social services were not being provided to tribal members.2*
In the Senate Subcommittee hearings on the Menominee
Restoration Act, Dr. Gary Orfield testified that "it would be a
mistake to move from the existing situation back to a situation
that existed before termination." 9' Orfield proposed instead that
the tribe's "assets would be a lot better off under the management
of Menominee leadership,""z leaving the BIA in a consulting role.
Orfield suggested that such a restoration would not only "play a
key role in restoring the future of Menominee people," but would
also have a wider effect: "Since Congress has never really explicit-
ly renounced [the termination] policy... nothing could be a more
'clear symbol of a new period in Indian affairs ... [than] to actually
begin to restore some of the rights of the people who were the first
and perhaps the principal victims of this policy."'""
Congress seems clearly to have intended that the Menominee
Restoration Act should have the symbolic effect suggested by Or-
field. Literally every major figure connected with the legislation
announced that the Menominee Restoration Act was intended to
be a repudiation of the termination policy. Unequivocal
statements to that effect were made by Lloyd Meeds, House Sub-
committee chairman and perhaps the most effective advocate of
the bill; ".. David R. Obey, Wisconsin congressman and original
primary sponsor when the bill was first introduced during the
Ninety-second Congress; 5 Harold V. Froehlich, Wisconsin con-
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gressman and primary sponsor during the Ninety-third
Congress;" Senator Henry M. Jackson, chairman of the Senate In-
terior Committee;2  Senators Gaylord Nelson 298 and William
Proxmire," the two primary sponsors in the Senate; Senator
James Abourezk, chairman of the Senate Indian Affairs
Subcommittee; 3°' Governor Patrick J. Lucey of Wisconsin;30' and
President Nixon." '
The repudiation of termination and the beginnings of the policy
of self-determination have continued apace since the passage of
the Menominee Act. Congress has enacted the Indian Self-
Determination and Education Assistance Act of 1975,- and other
important legislation.' The outlines of a new congressional direc-
tion for Indian affairs have begun to take shape. What remains to
be accomplished is the articulation and implementation of an ac-
ceptable kind of self-determination for the terminated tribes who
have not yet been restored.'
Conclusion
Perhaps the most appropriate action for bringing self-
determination to the terminated tribes is the formulation of a na-
tional restoration policy. Congress' power to restore tribes flows
from its well-established plenary power over Indian affairs.' In
the century preceding the Menominee restoration, there are
several examples of the reestablishment of federal control over
certain Indian tribes after all such control had been relinquished.-0
Thus, there is no serious doubt as to Congress' power to repeal the
existing termination acts and to restore the terminated tribes.
Many different legislative alternatives are available to restore
the terminated tribes. The alternatives range from a blanket repeal
of all termination acts to legislation permitting the Secretary of In-
terior to restore individual tribes on a tribe-by-tribe basis if
specified criteria are met.3"
While this article does not directly address the question of
whether the terminated tribes should be restored, it does suggest
that the termination acts were passed under highly questionable
circumstances. The concept of termination was not widely
debated. The individual acts were acted on with uncharacteristic
congressional haste. All termination legislation was handled most-
ly in subcommittee and mostly by a small number of legislators.
Many of the tactics employed are not ones that would be
duplicated today.
The circumstances surrounding the passage of the termination
legislation call for a searching reappraisal.- If that reappraisal
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calls for restoration of the terminated tribes, it would seem
especially appropriate that Congress enact comprehensive restora-
tion legislation as decisively as the termination legislation was
enacted during the 1950's.
NOTES
1. Indian Law is an inordinately complex field and any brief summary of the federal-
tribal relationship is inevitably an oversimplification. Many of the intricacies of the rela-
tionship should become apparent upon further reading of this article. Nevertheless, as a
starting point, it can be said that the federal-tribal relationship is premised upon these basic
notions: (1) Indian tribes are sovereigns and have governmental authority over their land
and persons on that land; that inherent authority can be taken away only by an express act
of Congress. See, e.g.,168 (1973); McClanahan v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164,
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341, 342, 348, 349, 381 (1970). See also FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 1, at 429-30 (ter-
mination of tribal governments in Oklahoma from 1898 to 1906); W. WASHBURN, RED
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headed by former Senator Dawes, the sponsor of the General Allotment Act. The purpose
of the Commission was to negotiate with the Five Civilized Tribes to allot their lands and to
dissolve their governments and tribal existence. The Commission's work is described in
Woodward v. DeGraffenreid, 238 U.S. 284 (1915). For other authorities on this important
era, see A. GIBSON, THE CHICKASAWS (1973); DEBO, AND STILL THE WATERS RUN. supra note
17; A. DEBO, THE RISE AND FALL OF THE CHOCTAW REPUBLIC (1934).
50. See generally Southern Surety Co. v. Oklahoma, 241 U.S. 582 (1916). After those
acts became effective, the Oklahoma land rush occurred and non-Indians flooded into the
former Indian Territory, now the new state of Oklahoma. See, e.g., TYLER. HISTORY. supra
note 6, at 105. As Debo put it, "the orgy of exploitation that resulted is almost beyond
belief." DEBO, supra note 17, at x. The Five Civilized Tribes then continued with very
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knowing what was in the report. Nevertheless, the document was never recalled .... [it]
called for inter alia:
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67. Id. at 15. See Zimmerman, The Role of the Bureau of Indian Affairs Since 1933,
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quidation. Senator Watkins assured her that "liquidation means to give use of all facilities
here to the Indians, not to take anything away from them." The reply: "Mrs. McNulty
[sic]. In that case I think it would be wonderful." Senator McFarland then commented, "I
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1st Session (1947), by the introduction of 133 private bills directing the Secretary of the In-
terior to issue fee patents to Indian land or to sell specific pieces of the Indian land base to
non-Indian buyers. WASHBURN, supra note 8, at 82. Thirteen other bills were introduced to
provide for Indian "emancipation," that is, the liquidation of tribal property of certain
tribes. Id. at 82-83. The power of the purse was also exercised by Congress in pursuit of its
objectives, both in fiscal years 1947 and 1948. TYLER, WORK PAPER, supra note 22, at 33;
TYLER. HISTORY. supra note 6, at 165; Schifter, Trends in FederalIndian Administration, 15
S.D.L. REv. 1, 4 n.11 (1970), citing Act of June 17, 1948, ch. 496, 2(a), (d), 62 Stat. 476. In-
dian Bureau budgets suffered "substantial" cuts in each of the two years, the reduction
amounting to $9,000,000 in 1948. See Schifter, supra.
76. A series of conferences was set up between the central Indian Bureau Office and
regional offices to develop indivdual programs for each reservation or area. Acting Com-
m'rs Circular No. 3762 (May 5, 1948). See TYLER, HISTORY, supra note 6, at 166; TYLER,
WORK PAPER, supra note 22, at 35. Specific instructions concerning the conferees' purpose
included the following directions: 'What is desired is the assembly in concise form of ex-
isting factual data as to the social and economic status of each group or tribe and, after a
careful analysis and evaluation of these data, the projection of a comprehensive long-range
program. The objective of the program should be the eventual discharge of the Federal
government's obligation, legal, moral, or otherwise, and the discontinuance of Federal
supervision and control at the earliest possible date compatible with the government's
trusteeship responsibility." Acting Comm'rs Circular No. 3675 (May 28, 1948). TYLER.
HISTORY, supra note 6, at 166; TYLER, WORK PAPERsupra note 22, at 35.
77 Comm'rs Circular No. 3537 (Nov. 14, 1943), referring to Circular No. 3514. Basic
Iribal programs called for by the latter circular were to include the following:
1. Inventories of tribal resources;
2. Appraisals of agency services;
3. Estimates of future tribal needs;
4. Long-term plans for preserving tribal resources and for adapting them to meet tribal
needs;
5. Statements outlining how services rendered by the Indian agencies might be
perpetuated (a) by other agencies, or (b) through the efforts of the Indians themselves.
TYLER, HISTORY supra note 6, at 144.
78. E.g., Repeal of the Wheeler-Howard Act, Hearings on S. 978 Before the Senate
Comm. on Indian Affairs, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. (1946).
79. See notes 64 and 65, supra.
80. Hasse, supra note 26, at 81.
81. COMMISSION ON ORGANIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF THE GOVERNMENT,
INDIAN AFFAIRS A REPORT TO CONGRESS (Mar. 1949).
82. Id. at 77-80. As indicated by the Hoover Commission's full title, that group was
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol5/iss1/4
authorized to report on executive branch reorganization, but had received no specific
authorization to mandate or recommend a sweeping change in the federal-tribal relation-
ship.
83. Id. at 59: "The Navajo Nation, comprising some 55,000 Indians in New Mexico,
Arizona, and Utah, is in severe financial straits that have caused widespread malnutrition
and starvation. This has occurred at a time when the United States as a whole is enjoying
prosperity .... Many other Indian groups.., face similarly severe conditions ......
84. Navajo-Hopi Rehabilitation Act of 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-474, 64 Stat. 44 (1950),
reprinted in [1950] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 44.
85. "Following a major airlift, the government reacted in the longer term with a 10-
year economic development program and a theory of surplus Indian population ... that
was to become the source of the relocation program .... Since the government had ignored
the possibilities of economic development on the reservation for so long, [the idea of reloca-
tion] was perhaps inevitable." STAFF OF AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY REVIEW COMM'N, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess., REPORT ON URBAN AND RURAL NON-RESERVATION INDIANS 46 (Comm. Print
1976) [hereinafter cited as TASK FORCE EIGHT].
86. Myer was, in Gary Orfield's words, "an aggressively innovating commissioner
with no experience in Indian Affairs." Orfield, supra note 10, ch. 4 at 3. See also Zimmer-
man, supra note 67, at 35 ("Mr. Myer was not informed about Indians, but he had ex-
perience with the Japanese as Director of the War Relocation Authority.") and FEY &
McNICKEL, supra note 61, at 150 ("The methods [Mr. Myer] used in bringing about resettle-
ment of the Japanese were forceful, and at times coercive. Some critics of Mr. Myer's Indian
policies accused him of transferring to the Indian situation the same thinking, if not the
same methods, that had served in moving people out of the Japanese relocation [intern-
ment] camps. Mr. Myer denied these accusations and insisted that his was a more realistic
appraisal of Indian needs and aspirations than that of the men who had preceded him in re-
cent years.") Many of Myer's wartime subordinates followed him into the Indian Service,
causing critics to comment that energy had been substituted for experience and expertise in
Bureau administration. See, e.g. Cohen, supra note 4, at 383, 384 n.137: "Assistant Com-
missioner Zimmerman... was swiftly replaced by a former WRA official who knew
nothing of Indians. Shortly thereafter, the Bureau's Chief Counsel... was removed and
replaced by another ex-WRA official .... A superintendent suspected of being too 'soft'
towards the Blackfeet Indians of Montana was replaced by a former warden of a W.R.A.
detention camp." Myer himself was the object of a great deal of controversy in his role as
head of the Indian Bureau. See, id. at 389 n.158 (Rep. Toby Morris calling Myer "a man of
unimpeachable integrity" and "a very able administrator," versus Harold L. Ickes, who had
recommended Myer for the Indian Commissionership, calling him "a blundering and dic-
tatorial tin-Hitler.") But see id. at 389-90: "[T]he problem of bureaucratic aggrandizement
has deeper roots than one will find who looks only to the personality or background of in-
dividual administrators."
87. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 2503, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 3-4,14-45 (1952).
88. COMM'R INDIAN AFFAIRS ANN. REP. 353 (1951), quoted in TYLER, HISTORY, supra
note 6, at 167.
89. H.R. REP. No. 2680, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 7,11 (1954).
90. Id. at 11. Apparently, this remark referred to the potentially available Indian
manpower after relocation had occurred, as well as the "cooperation" involved in making
available previously restricted reservation resources to special interests interested in ex-
ploiting those resources. Cf. note 256, infra, and accompanying text.
91. La V. Madigan, The American Indian Relocation Program 3 (Report for Assoc. on
American Indian Affairs, Inc., December 1956) [hereinafter cited as Madigan]. According
to Fey and McNickel, the first Indian employment centers in urban areas were established
in 1931. See FEY & McNICKEL, supra note 61, at 149. See also TYLER. HISTORY. supra note 6,
at 155-59. Beginning in 1950, the Navajo Rehabilitation Act and other programs emphasiz-
ed relocation efforts, although its thrust initially seemed to provide an alternative to reloca-
tion. See note 85, supra and accompanying text.
92. Madigan, supra note 91, at 7: "Urban areas were regarded as providing generally
available employment. Applicants to the program were accepted on the basis of whether
they could 'be expected to succeed'."
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93. Letter from the Commissioner of Indian Affairs to Rep. Sadlak, Mar. 9, 1956,
reprinted in Madigan, supra note 91, at 3: "We must face facts and one of the most impor-
tant facts is that there is a definite physical limit to resource development on the reserva-
tions. The Navajo Reservation... is a good illustration. Under the most optimistic estimate
the resources of this reservation, after full development, might be expected to provide a de-
cent livelihood for about 45,000 people. Yet the present Navajo population is about 78,000
and, if present growth trends continue.., will reach ... approximately 350,000 by the year
2000."
94. Madigan, supra note 91, at 17. See also Hasse, supra note 26, at 130: "In practice,
the [relocation] program was less than voluntary since it prodded Indians to leave the reser-
vation by offering immediate financial assistance for moving while reservation economic
programs offered only marginal benefit."
95. Id. at 8. One criticism of this type was that relocation drained off the strength of
the Indian population, leaving the old, the young, and the sick to face reservation poverty
alone. A corresponding argument was that relocation immersed Indian families in an alien
culture with inadequate preparation for the new experience, and expected them to act like
immigrants and "make it on their own." The results of the program were mixed, but they
seemed to indicate that mere change of circumstances was not sufficient to change basic
cultural attitudes and personality traits.
96. See notes 264-266 and accompanying text, infra.
97. Joint Hearings on Termination, supra note 70, pt. 1 at 45. See also, STAFF OF
HOUSE COMM. ON INTERIOR & INSULAR AFFAIRS, SURVEY REPORT ON THE B.I.A., 83d Cong., 2d
SESS. 22-23 (Comm. Print 1954).
98. Joint Hearings on Termination, supra note 70, pt. I at 45.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 46.
101. See STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON INTERIOR& INSULAR AFFAIRS. 85th CONG., 2d Sess.,
INDIAN LAND TRANSACTIONS xvii-xxi, 1-17 (Comm. Print 1958); Chambers & Price,
Regulating Sovereignty: Secretarial Discretion and the Leasing of Indian Lands, 26 STAN L.
REV. 1061-64, 1074-75 (1974).
102. Hasse, supra note 26, at 143.
103. Zimmerman, supra note 67, at 35.
104. See Cohen, supra note 4, at 359: "A bill to authorize employees of the Indian
Bureau to carry arms and to make arrests, searches, and seizures without warrant, for
violation of Bureau regulations [was introduced under Myer's
administration) .... Commissioner Myer... gave the proposal his full support.., charging
that critics of the measure were either dishonest or dupes of dishonest agitators." Federal
funds were used to influence tribal elections. Id. at 353-54. The Bureau directly and
forcefully interfered with some tribal elections during this period. Id. at 354-55. Commis-
sioner Myer's proposed regulations to control the selections of tribal attorneys and their ac-
tivities were rejected by the Secretary of the Interior, but the practice was followed and
defended as already existing procedure. According to Cohen, "during more than a decade
before Mr. Myer took office no Indian tribe had ever been denied the right to retain as its
attorney any lawyer in good standing at the bar. Since Mr. Myer took office more than for-
ty Indian tribes have complained of Bureau interference in this right." Id. at 355-56. Cohen
also noted that "when the Oglala Sioux Tribe... petitioned Congress to cut wasteful expen-
ditures of the Indian Bureau in its so-called 'extension service,' in South Dakota, the Indians
were advised that $140,000 of credit funds allocated to the tribe would be 'frozen' until the
tribe withdrew its criticisms." Id. at 356, citing Appropriations for 1952for the Department
of the Interior, Hearings Before the House Comm. on Appropriations, 82d Cong., 1st Sess.
1243, 1263 (1951).
105. See Cohen, supra note 4, at 356.
106. H.R. REP. No. 2680, 83d Cong. 2d Sess. 10 (1954). See also BROPHY & ADERLE.
supra note 2, at 29 ("Contrary to widespread popular belief, the government has not
always cheated the Indians"); Cohen, supra note 4, at 375 n.101 ("Mounting evidence of
the misuse of tribal funds.., by the Indian Bureau Iwasi brought to light ... in 1928").
107. See H.R. REP. No. 2680, supra note 106, at 8.
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108. Cohen, supra note 4, at 382 n.135.
109. Id. at 379-82.
110. "[TIhe position of the government was voiced by Interior Secretary Douglas
McKay: 'Now let me say a few words about the principle of Indian 'consent'... It seems to
me that the principle of Indian 'consent'. . . has most serious Constitutional implications.
With full respect for the rights of the Indian people, I believe it would be extremely
dangerous to pick out any segment of the population and arm its members with authority
to frustrate the will of Congress which the whole people has elected." TYLER, HISTORY, supra
note 6, at 184-85, quoting Douglas McKay, Letter to Oliver LaFarge, President of the
Association of American Affairs, Inc. (Nov. 30, 1955). In point of fact, "there had been no
official congressional declaration on the matter of consent." TYLER, HISTORY supra at 185.
111. Cohen, supra note 4, at 376.
112. Id. at 380, quoting Op. SOL. DEPT INT.. July 2, 1951.
113. Cohen, supra note 4, at 380.
114. The resolution is set out in the resulting report, H.R. REP. No. 2503, 82d Cong.,
2d Sess. (1952).
115. The resolution is set out in the resulting report, H.R. REP. No. 2680, 83d Cong.,
2d Sess. v-vi (1954).
116. See note 76, supra. See also TYLER. HISTORY. supra note 6, at 166-68.
117. See TYLER, HISTORY, supra note 6, at 172.
118. H.R. REP. No. 2680, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 8-9, 11 (1954). See also Watkins, supra
note 5, at 51 ("Secluded reservation life is a deterrent to the Indian .... Self-reliance is basic
to the whole Indian-freedom program."); Stern, supra note 67, at 30. The four Zimmerman
criteria are specified in the text accompanying note 68, supra.
119. See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 4, at 390. See generally Zimmerman, supra note 67;
Orfield, supra note 10.
120. House Concurrent Resolution 108 is quoted in full in the text accompanying note
121, infra. The individual acts are listed in Part II infra.
121. 67 Stat. B132.
122. See, e.g., 1A C. SANDS. SUTHERLAND'S STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 29.03, at 337-
38 (1972); American Indian and Alaska Natives Policy, Hearings on S. Con. Res. 26 Before
the Senate Comm. on Interior& InsularAffairs, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 98-99 (1971). See also
C. ZINN, How OUR LAWS ARE MADE, H.R. Doc. No. 509, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 7-8 (1976).
123. Martone, American Indian Tribal Self-government in the Federal System, 51
NOTRE DAME LAW., 600, 616 n.136 (1976); BROPHY & ABERLE, supra note 2, at 182; Hearings
on S. Con. Res. 26, supra note 122, at 98.
124. E.g., Hearings on S. Con. Res. 26, supra note 122, at 44-46 (California Indian
Legal Services Draft Bill on National Indian Policy; American Indian Chicago Conference,
Declaration of Indian Purpose (June 19, 1961), reprinted in STAFF OF AMERICAN INDIAN
POLICY REVIEW COMMN. 94TH CONG.. 2D SESS., REPORT ON FEDERAL ADMINISTRATION AND
STRUCTURE OF INDIAN AFFAIRS 186 (Comm. Print 1976).
125. Oliver LaFarge, president of the Association on American Indian Affairs,
estimated the Indian population in the United States to be 400,000 in 1950. LaFarge, AAIA
Restatement of Program and Policy in Indian Affairs, in Papers of Phileo Nash, Truman
Library (Feb. 8, 1950), quotedin Hasse, supra note 26, at 114. A total of 12,000 terminated
individuals would be slightly less than 3 per cent of the 1950 estimate.
126. In 1953, approximately 43 million acres of land were held in trust for Indians.
H.R. REP No. 2503, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 60-74 (1953).
127. 26 Fed. Reg. 3726-3755 (1961). See also 26 Fed. Reg. 7362 (1961) (Klamath Ter-
mination Plan); 26 Fed. Reg. 8042 (Mixed-blood Ute Termination Plan).
128. H.R. REP. No. 841, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. (1953); H.R. REP. No. 2680, 83d Cong.,
2d Sess. (1954); Watkins, supra note 5, at 47; H.C.R. 108, 83d Cong. 1st Sess. (1953), 67
Stat. 3132.
129. The elements of the special federal-tribal relationship are summarized in note 1,
supra. The relationship was not "terminated" in all respects because Congress retained a
"continuing partial guardianship" in regard to some questions of property and competency.
See Otradovec v. First Wisconsin Trust, 454 F.2d 1258 (7th Cir. 1972); Crain v. First Nat'l
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Bank, 324 F.2d 532 (9th Cir. 1963). In addition, both the Menominee and Klamath tribes
established that their treaty hunting and fishing rights were not taken away by their ter-
mination acts. Menominee Tribe v. United States, 391 U.S. 404 (1968); Kimball v.
Callahan, 493 F.2d 564 (9th Cir. 1974), overruling Klamath & Modoc Tribes v. Maison,
338 F.2d 620 (9th Cir. 1964).
130. See, e.g., TASK FORCE TEN. supra note 10, at 27.
131. Trulove & Bunting, supra note 10, at 15.
132. Id. at 17; TASK FORCE TEN. supra note 10, at 24.
133. The state corporations for the two tribes are discussed in Menominee Tribe v.
United States, 391 U.S. 404, 408-10 (1968), and Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406
U.S. 128, 132-40 (1972).
134. See, e.g., FREEDOM WITH RESERVATION 27. 30 (D. Shames ed. 1972) (a report and
analysis of the Menominee termination from Menominee perspective).
135. See generally Chambers, supra note 1.
136. See generally United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544 (1975); Worcester v.
Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832); FEDERAL INDIAN LAW. supra note 1, at 122. For the ef-
fect of Public Law 280, discussed in the text accompanying notes 207-227, infra, on state
legislative jurisdiction, see the authorities cited in notes 207, 217, infra.
137. Fisher v. District County Ct., 424 U.S. 382, 386-91 (1976); FEDERAL INDIAN LAW.
supra note 1, at 120. The effect of Public Law 280 on state jurisdiction is discussed in notes
207-212, 217 and accompanying text, infra.
138. See, e.g., United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 384 (1886); 5 UNITED STATES
COMM-N ON Clv. RIGHTS REP. 146-48 (1961); STAFF OF AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY REVIEW
COMM'N, 94th CONG., 2d SESS., REPORT ON FEDERAL, STATE, AND TRIBAL JURISDICTION 15-24,
32 (Comm. Print 1976).
139. See, e.g., Moe v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes, -U.S.-, 96 S.Ct.
1634, 1643-44 (1976).
140. E.g., 20 U.S.C. §§ 236-41(1) and 631-47 (1970), the "Impact Aid" laws.
Rosenfelt, Toward a More Coherent Policy for Funding Indian Education, 40 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROB. 190, 195-96 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Rosenfelt, Indian Education]. See
also notes 233-234, infra, and accompanying text.
141. See, e.g., Israel, supra note 1, at 624-51. Although termination cut off pro-
grams to federally recognized tribes, terminated tribes remain eligible for some programs
available to Indians generally See TASK FORCE TEN. supra note 10, at 1665-70. See also,
e.g., The Indian Education Act of 1972, 20 U.S.C. §§ 241aa, 887c, 2111a (Supp. I1, 1974)
(definition of "tribe" for eligibility purposes); 20 U.S.C. § 1221h (Supp. Ill, 1974), (express-
ly includes terminated tribes).
142. See generally Rosenfelt, Indian Education, supra note 140; STAFF OF AMERICAN
IIDIAN POLICY REVIEW COMM'N, 94TH CONG., 2D SESS., REPORT ON INDIAN HEALTH (Comm.
Print 1976). As is the case with federal programs to tribes, individual Indians remain eligi-
ble for some programs even after termination. See note 141, supra.
143. McClanahan v. Ariz. Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 168 (1973); Talton v. Mayes,
163 U.S. 376, 382-85 (1896); Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 551, 557 (1832);
FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 1, at 122-26. See Moe v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai
Tribes, to -U.S.-, 96 S.Ct. 1642 (1976) ("the 'backdrop' of the Indian sovereignty doc-
trine" underlies modern preemption analysis); Fisher v. District County Ct., 424 U.S. 382,
386 (1976) ("The right of the Northern Cheyenne Tribe to govern itself has been consistent-
ly protected by federal statute"); United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 557 (1975) (Indian
tribes "possess... independent authority over matters that affect the internal and social
relations of tribal life"). But see Martone, supra note 123, at 632-33, who argues that In-
dian tribes do not possess inherent sovereignty. He gives only superficial treatment to the
very important recent cases, supra, perhaps due to publishing deadlines.
144. The one known exception is the Klamath Tribe, which has developed a com-
prehensive fish and game management plan. Klamath Tribal Wildlife Management Plan,
June 14, 1976 (copy on file at American Indian Law Review Office). A common misconcep-
tion is that federal termination of services to a particular tribe caused that tribe to "cease to
exist." The fallacy of that assumption is shown by the opinions in two recent federal cases:
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"The Termination Act did not abolish the tribe or its membership. It merely terminated
federal supervision... " (emphasis in original). Menominee Tribe v. United States, 388 F.2d
998, 1000-1001 (Ct. Cl. 1967), aff'd, 391 U.S. 4040 (1970). "[Tlhe Passamaquoddies were a
tribe before the nation's founding .... The absence of specific federal recognition in and of
itself provides little basis for concluding that the Passamaquoddies are not a 'tribe'...."
Joint Tribal Council of the Passamaquoddy Tribe v. Morton, 528 F.2d 370, 378 (1st Cir.
1975). Accord, Otradovec v. First Wisconsin Trust, 454 F.2d 1258 (7th Cir. 1972); Crain v.
First Nat'l Bank, 324 F.2d 532 (9th Cir. 1963). A California tribe has also been held to sur-
vive termination. Duncan v. Kleppe, Civil No. C-71-1572, R.F.P C-71-1713 R.F.P. (N.D.
Cal. 1976) (approximately 15 similar cases pending in California).
145. See Bean, The Limits of Tribal Sovereignty: The Cornucopia of Inherent
Powers, 49 N.D.L. REV. 303 (1973).
146. Typical of the amounts received by the smaller tribes for their land is the $500
received by most members of the Siletz Tribe of western Oregon. TASK FORCE TEN, supra
note 10, at 27. The $43,000 received by withdrawing members of the Klamath Tribe in
1961, Trulove & Bunting, supra note 10, at 15, 17, was based on an appraisal which
underestimated the value of the land, as established in a later court case. TASK FORCE TEN,
supra at 55. Remaining members of the Klamath Tribe (about 22 per cent of the tribal
membership) received approximately $103,000 in 1973, id. at 57, the increased amount
probably being due as much to inflation as to the appreciation of the value of the former
tribal land. For a discussion of the unfair business practices by the local non-Indian com-
munity which resulted in the loss of some of the 1961 distribution, see the authorities cited
in note 178 infra.
147. See generally T. STERN, THE KLAMATH TRIBE: A PEOPLE AND THEIR RESERVATION
(1966); TASK FORCE TEN, supra note 10, at 62-65; V. DELORIA, CUSTER DIED FOR YOUR SINS
60-82 (1969); CAHN, supra note 44, at 16-23.
148. See the extensive discussion in Orfield, supra note 10, ch. 1, at 2 et seq. See also
notes 185-191, infra, and accompanying text.
149. Hasse, supra note 26, at 181.
150. Id. at 181-82. See also notes 182-184, infra, and accompanying text.
151. Hasse, supra note 26, at 181. For objections to specific bills, see notes 182-184,
infra, and accompanying text.
152. See Orfield, supra note 10, ch. 1, at 1, citing Grodzins, Centralization and
Decentralization in the American Federal System, A NATION OF STATES 5 (R. Goldwin ed.
1961).
153. Orfield, supra note 10, ch. 1, at 1.
154. Id. See also note 128 and accompanying text.
155. Orfield, supra note 10, ch. 1, at 2.
156. Id. at 3.
157. Id. at 2.
158. See J. FREEMAN. THE POLITICAL PROCESS 98-101 (1965).
159. CAHN, supra note 44 at 163-73; TYLER, HISTORY, supra note 6, at 154-59. Cf.
notes 20-22, 50, supra, and accompanying text; Goldberg, Public Law 280: The Limits of
State Jurisdiction overReservation Indians, 22 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 535,536 (1975).
160. See notes 162-174, infra, and accompanying text.
161. See notes 148-155, supra, and accompanying text.
162. Orfield, supra note 10, ch. 1, at 4.
163. See id.
164. Watkins had been chairman of the Indian Affairs subcommittee of the Senate
Committee on Public Lands before the Senate Reorganization in 1947. See, e.g., [19471
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at lv (listing subcommittee members of the Senate Public
Lands Committee).
165. Orfield, supra note 10, ch. 1, at 4.
166. See generally, Watkins, supranoteS.
167. Hasse, supra note 26, at 176.
168. Id. at 176-77.
169. Id. at 177. See note 174, infra, for examples of the use of questionable tactics to
obtain tribal "consent." See also notes 195-196 and accompanying text, infra.
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170. See notes 175-181 infra and accompanying text.
171. See generally Orfield, supra note 10; Stern, supra note 67.
172. "Even though they [the Indians] don't like it," said Watkins, "I think it is better
for them to have more and more control of their properties." Orfield, supra note 10, at 44.
173. Watkins, supra note 5, at 47.
174. When a bill providing for per capita payment of a judgment of $8,500,000, for a
50-year-old Menominee claim against the Forest Service, passed the House of Represen-
tatives in 1953, Senator Watkins held the bill in committee. Watkins explained to the
Menominees at a tribal hearing that they could not obtain their funds unless they agreed to
termination. The tribe voted to agree in principle. The bill as amended by Watkins was re-
jected by a later meeting of the tribe, but it easily passed the Senate, The Conference Com-
rnittee accepted the Senate bill, refusing to hear either tribal delegates or Representative
Laird, the original sponsor of the bill. The Conference Report was defeated on the floor of
the House, mainly because Laird had been denied a fair hearing. Many Menominees now
viewed termination as inevitable, and tribal members wanted their judgment shares. The
tribe voted to support a draft termination bill that included a $1,500 per capita payment.
As amended, this bill later became law. Watkins' efforts had been successful. Orfield, supra
note 10, ch. 2, at 2. Watkins' "threat" was also condemned by the House Interior Commit-
tee during the passage of the Menominee Restoration Act. See H.R. REP. No. 572, 93d
Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1973).
The Colvilles had a similar experience, though Watkins' role in the matter was less
clear. The Colville Tribe had been attempting for years to regain over 800,000 acres of
land, taken from the tribe by mistake. Hasse, supra note 26, at 141-142. The 1956 act
restoring the land contained a rider requiring the tribe to submit a plan for termination
within five years. The plan was submitted, but the termination bill was never passed. See
Colville Termination Hearing on S. 282 Before the Subcomm. on Indian Affairs of the
Senate Comm. on Interior& InsularAffairs, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2 (1967).
175. Orfield, supra note 10, at 14. See also Stern, supra note 67, at 36; Watkins,
supra note 4, at 44.
176. Joint Hearings on Termination, supra note 70, pt. 4, quotedin Stern, supra note
67, at 67-72. See note 74, supra, and accompanying text.
177. Joint Hearings on Termination, supra note 70, pt. 4, quoted in Stern, supra note
67, at 72. When one witness found the sudden emphasis on termination "just a bit
peculiar," Watkins stated that "the State itself suggested the idea that it ought to terminate,
ard we assumed that the State had been working on it. "Joint Hearings on Termination, pt.
6 at 655. Orfield remarked that "this assertion was false, but it was not challenged." Or-
field, supra note 10, ch. 2, at 4.
178. "Senator Watkins. The fact of the matter is that most of the whites [in the area of
the Klamath Reservation] would have a business experience far above the average white
man in the United States. Is that not true?"
"Mr. Pryse. I expect so."
"Senator Watkins. And they would be reputable people, who could give [the Indiansl
good sound advice?"
"Mr. Pryse. Yes, sir." Joint Hearings on Termination, supra note 70, quoted in Stern,
supra note 67, at 68. In fact, the opposite of what Watkins had suggested occurred at ter-
mination; the Klamaths lost most of their per capita payments, largely through the highly
questionable business practices of non-Indians in the area. See TASK FORCE TEN, supra note
10, at 59. These unfair business practices by the local non-Indian community at the time of
the Klamath termination were documented by the Federal Trade Commission during hear-
ings in Klamath Falls in 1972. FEDERAL TRADE COMM'N, SEATTLE REGIONAL OFFICE, A REPORT
OF THE CONSUMER PROBLEMS OF THE KLAMATH INDIANS: A CASE FOR ACTION (1973).
179. See Orfield, supra note 10, ch. 1, at 13.
180. See notes 172-173, supra.
181. See notes 172-180, supra, and accompanying text.
182. Orfield, supra note 10, ch. 1, at 7.
183. See notes 200-201, infra, and accompanying text.
184. Joint Hearings on Termination, supra note 70, pt. 6 at 594-605.
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185. Hasse, supra note 26, at 184. See also Goldberg, supra note 159, at 543-44.
186. Act of Aug. 15, 1953, ch. 505, 67 Stat. 588-90 (now codified as amended in 18
U.S.C. §§ 1151, 1162 and 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1360 (1970)). See also notes 207-227, infra,
and accompanying text.
187. Hasse, supra note 26, at 189.
188. Id. TYLER, HISTORY, supra note 6, at 183-85.
189. Id. at 191. On the "tribal consent" issue, see generally Goldberg, supra note 159,
at 535-51.
190. In 1968, Congress finally passed legislation providing that Public Law 280 cannot
be imposed on any tribe without its consent. 25 U.S.C. § § 1321(a), 1322(a), 1326 (1970).
191. Hasse, supra note 26, at 206.
192. Orfield, supra note 10, ch. 1, at 5, 6.
193. Oregon Indians assented to the termination policy after the Bureau of Indian Af-
fairs refused to recommend passage of a bill distributing the Indian Claims Commission
award. "I think they are a little unhappy at the present time," the Associate Commissioner
said, "because of the slowness in getting their judgment funds distributed. Mr. Chairman,
you will recall that you had a hearing on that bill last week; and I think, if that particular
problem is wound up with fair dispatch, they will feel a little better about this legislation."
Joint Hearings on Termination, supra note 70, pt. 3 at 187. See also id. at 179-81. Other
tribes, including the Menominee, Klamath, and Colville, were similarly persuaded. See
note 174, supra, and accompanying text; STERN, supra note 147, at 251-52.
194. joint'Hearings on Termination, supra note 70, pt. I at 17.
195. Id. at 46.
196. Id.
197. The various kinds of control over tribal land after termination are discussed at
notes 130-134, supra, and accompanying text.
198. Joint Hearings on Termination, supra note 70, pt. I at 44.
199. Id. at 49.
200. Orfield, supra note 10, ch. 1, at 7.
201. Id. See also STERN, supra note 147, at 252.
202. TYLER, HISTORY, supra note 6, at 179; TYLER, WORK PAPER, supra note 22, at 51-
52.
203. For the transfer of health and education functions to the state, see text accompa-
nying notes 228-254, infra. Relocation as an assimilationist device is discussed in the text
accompanying notes 91-100, supra, and notes 261-270, infra. The low priority given to
economic development is discussed in joint Hearings on Termination, supra note 70, pt. 1
at 41.
204. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 2680, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 15 etseq. (1954); Hearingson
S.C.R. 26, supra note 122, at 96-98. See generally Cohen, supra note 4; Orfield, supra
note 10; Hasse, supra note 26.
205. Hasse, supra note 26, at 261.
206. TYLER, HISTORY, supra note 6, at 174-76; CAHN, supra note 44, at 16-23; V.
DELORIA, CUSTER DIED FOR YOUR SINS 60-82 (1969); D. McNICKEL, THEY CAME HERE FIRST 257
(rev. ed. 1975).
207. Act of Aug. 15, 1953, ch. 505, 67 Stat. 588-90 (now codified as amended in 18
U.S.C. §§ 1151, 1162, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1360). Public Law 280 was enacted two weeks to
the day after the passage of H.C.R. 108. See notes 186-191, supra, and accompanying text.
See generally Goldberg, Public Law 280: The Limits of State Jurisdiction over Reservation
Indians, 22 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 535 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Goldberg]. Goldberg's com-
prehensive and extraordinarily analytical work has been repeatedly relied upon by the
courts. See, e.g. Bryan v. Itasca County,-U.S.-, 96 S.Ct. 2102 (1976); Santa Rosa Band
of Indians v. Kings County, 532 F.2d 655 (9th Cir. 1975). See also STAFF OF AMERICAN
INDIAN POLICY REVIEW COMM'N, 94TH Cong., 2D SEss.. REPORT ON FEDERAL, STATE, AND
TRIBALJURISDICTION 4-33 (Comm. Print 19761.
208. See Goldberg, supra note 207, at 540. Goldberg distinguishes Public Law 280
from earlier transfers of jurisdiction to the states, and lists the six pre-1950 statutes giving
some or all reservation jurisdiction to individual states. Id. at n.20. These isolated assimila-
tionist statutes, however, were not general policy, but rather ad hoc actions affecting par-
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ticular areas, such as those acts discussed in footnotes 48-51, supra. See New York ex rel.
Ray v. Martin, 326 U.S. 496 (1946); Draper v. United States, 164 U.S. 240 (1896); United
States v. McBratney, 104 U.S. 621 (1882) (recognizing state jurisdiction over crimes by
non-Indians against non-Indians in Indian country). Moreover, previous transfers had
taken place after consultation with the state and tribe or tribes. Id. at n.21. Such consulta-
tion was notably lacking for a decade and a half following the enactment of Public Law
280. See notes 186-190 and 192-201, supra, and accompanying text. More recently, the
Supreme Court has moved away from "the easy conclusion of state ... jurisdiction" to an
analysis of whether state jurisdiction would impinge on "the tribe as sovereign." M. PRICE,
LAW AND THE AMERICAN INDIAN 66 (1973). See, e.g., Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959)
and the authorities cited in note 143, supra.
209. The original states were California, Nebraska, Minnesota, Oregon, and Wiscon-
sin. 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (1970). Specific reservations were exempted in the latter three states.
The sixth state was Alaska, added in 1958. Act of Aug. 8, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-615, § 2, 72
Stat. 545.
210. Act of Aug. 15, 1953, ch. 505, §§ 6,7, 67 Stat. 588-90.
211. 18 U.S.C. § 1162(b) (1970); 28 U.S.C. § 1360(b) (1970). The legislative history
suggests that the exemption for rights under treaties, agreements, statutes, and implemen-
ting regulations was intended to be broad. See Goldberg, supra note 207, at 583-93. C.f.
Bryan v. Itasca County,-U.S.-, 96 S.Ct. 2102 (1976).
212. "As a practical matter, the enforcement of law and order among the Indians in
the Indian country has been largely left to the Indian groups themselves. In many states,
tribes are not adequately organized to perform that function; consequently, there has been
created a hiatus in law enforcement authority that could best be remedied by conferring
criminal jurisdiction on states .... H.R. REP. No. 848, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1953); S.
REP. No. 699, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1953), reprinted in 11954] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 2412-13. But see NATIONAL AMERICAN INDIAN COURT JUDGES ASS'N, JUSTICE AND THE
AMERICAN INDIAN 6, 50 (1974) [hereinafter cited as NATIONAL AMERICAN INDIAN COURT
JUDGES ASS'N]: "About half of the Indians feel they are treated poorly or indifferently by
state, county and local police .... The Indian communities are both willing and able to
handle their own legal systems. Every effort should now be made... to remove state
jurisdiction from those reservations that wish to operate their own judicial and law and
order systems."
213. Goldberg, supra note 207, at 543.
214. Id. The concept of advanced Indian acculturation seemed to contradict the no-
tion that criminal jurisdiction was necessary because of Indian disorderliness and incapaci-
ty for self-government. Both alternatives, of course, ignored the possibility that nonac-
culturated Indians could have capacity for self-government in their own right.
215. Id. at 562.
216. Id. at 544.
217. But Public Law 280 did not in fact extend state regulatory control to the reserva-
tions. In Bryan v. Itasca County,-U.S.-, 96 S.Ct. 2102 (1976), the Supreme Court
declared that Public Law 280 was concerned mainly with criminal jurisdiction, and extend-
ed state civil jurisdiction to adjudicate civil "causes of action," but did not include such
state regulatory powers as taxation. 96 S.Ct. at 2107-13. The Court concluded that "if Con-
gress in enacting Pub. L. 280 had intended to confer upon the States general civil regulatory
powers ... over reservation Indians, it would have expressly said so." Id. at 2112.
218. Goldberg, supra note 207, at 551.
219. See id. at 551-52 nn.87-89. New resources such as fines and court costs, available
to the states under Public Law 280, paid only about 10 per cent of expenses. Mandatory
Public Law 280 states had no choice but to accept jurisdiction once the bill was passed;
thus, these states were the hardest hit. Id. at n.90.
220. Id, at 552; 5 COMM-N ON CIV. RIGHTS REP. 148 (1961).
221. 5 COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS. supra note 220, at 146. See generally 5 NATIONAL
AMERICAN INDIAN COURT JUDGES AssN, supra note 212.
222. TYLER, HISTORY, supra note 6, at 183-85. President Eisenhower expressed deep
discomfort with lack of provisions in the bill for consultation with tribes on state assertion
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of jurisdiction, and he recommended that Public Law 280 be amended to include such a
provision. Indian leaders regarded the principle of consultation as a sham and demanded a
consent provision. Id. See notes 187-190, supra, and accompanying text.
223. See notes 185-191, supra, and accompanying text.
224. See S. REP. No. 699, supra note 212, at 5.
225. Goldberg, supra note 207, at 545 n.49. The departure from prior practice of con-
sulting with the Indians before transfer of jurisdiction was considered a deliberate slight.
226. 5 COMM'N ON Civ. RIGHTS REP. supra note 220, at 146.
227. Id. at 148. See generally 5 NATIONAL AMERICAN INDIAN COURT JUDGES Ass-N,
supra note 212. See also STAFF OF AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY REVIEW COMM'N, 94th CONG., 2d
SEss., REPORT ON FEDERAL, STATE, AND TRIBAL JURISDICTION 15-24, 32 (Comm. Print 1976).
228. See, e.g., AMERICANIZING THE AMERICAN INDIANS, supra note 28, at 191-292 (four-
teen writings on assimilative Indian education, 1880-1900); notes 36-41, supra, and ac-
companying text.
229. Rosenfelt, Community Control, supra note 36 at 501; Brightman, An Historical
Overview ofIndian Education, 1 INDIAN EDUCATION CONFRONTS THE SEVENTIES 57 (1974).
230. Rosenfelt, Community Control, supra note 36, at 501.
231. Brightman, supra note 229.
232. Id. citing, Indian Education, Hearings Before the Special Subcomm. on Indian
Education of the Senate Comm. on Labor & Public Welfare, 90th Cong., 1st and 2d Sess.,
pt. I at 19-20. (1969).
233. Rosenfelt, Indian Education, supra note 140, at 201, citing 20 U.S.C. §§ 631-647
(1970).
234. Id. at 201; Natonabah v. Board of Educ., 355 F. Supp. 716, 721-22 (D.N.M.
1973).
235. See, e.g., Natonabah v. Board of Educ., 355 F. Supp. 716, 726-28 (D.N.M.
1973). The Johnson-O'Malley Act is codified as 25 U.S.C. §§ 452-54 (1970).
236. The two cases were Natonabah v. Board of Educ., 355 F. Supp. 716, 729
(D.N.M. 1973); Denetclarence v. Board of Education of Independent School Dist. No. 22,
Civil No. 8872 (D.N.M., Filed Feb. 14, 1974), (incorporating Agreement of Parties dated
Dec. 14, 1973). For the revised regulations, see 25 C.F.R. § 33 (1975), as amended, 40 Fed.
Reg. 51282 (Nov. 4, 1975).
237. Hasse, supra note 26, at 255.
238. Id. at 256-57.
239. SENATE COMM. ON LABOR AND PUBLIC WELFARE, INDIAN EDUCATION- A NATIONAL
TRAGEDY-A NATIONAL CHALLENGE, S. REP. No. 501, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. xiv (1969).
240. Id. at 14, 163. See generally Brightman, supra note 229; Rosenfelt, Community
Control, supra note 36, at 500-502.
241. S. REP. No. 1530, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. (1954), reprinted in [19541 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS at 2918, 2919, 2925.
242. Act of Aug. 15, 1953, Pub. L. No. 277, 83d Cong., 1st Sess., ch. 502, 67 Stat.
586.
243. Act of Aug. 15, 1953, Pub. L. No. 281, 83d Cong., 1st Sess., ch. 506, 67 Stat.
590.
244. See note 241, supra.
245. Transfer of Indian Hospitals and Health Facilities to Public Health Service, Hear-
ings on H.R. 303 Before the Subcomm. on Indian Affairs of the Senate Comm. on Interior
& InsularAffairs, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 4-5, 18-19, 50-53 (1954).
246. E.g., id. at 963-65.
247. E.g., id. at 15-16, 45, 134-50; S. REP. No. 1530, supra note 241, at 15-19.
248. See generally, Hearings on H.R. 303, supra note 245.
249. Act of Aug. 5,1954, Pub. L. No. 568, 67 Stat. 674, reprinted in [19541 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 779-80.
250. Id. at § 4.
251. Id. at § 1. See Hasse, supra note 26, at 253: "Watkins assured Indians that their
hospitals would not be closed until they were ready for it. Representative Edmondson
challenged this statement by predicting that this action would be a convenient ruse to cover
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the planning out of institutions providing Indian health care. Edmondson's prediction
proved to be true, but the Public Health Service did arrange for Indians to use public
facilities where Bureau hospitals were closed. Nevertheless, neither tribal leaders nor con-
gressmen knew for sure whether or not the services would be improved. And complicated
problems, inherent in the situation where impoverished Indians were forced to use facilities
designed for the general public, remained to be solved. [Citations omitted]."
252. S. REP. No. 1530, supra note 241, reprinted in [1954] U.S. CODE CONG. a AD
NEWS at 2921.
253. Id. at 2927.
254. In spite of the motives behind the transfer of Indian health from the BIA to HEW,
the realignment has been seen by many as resulting in improved health services for Indians.
See generally STAFF OF AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY REVIEW COMM'N, 94th CONG., 2d S,,s.
REPORT ON INDIAN HEALTH 32, 85-87 (Comm. Print 1976). Most criticism by Indians of the
Indian Health Service is based on inadequate funding, not on the transfer from the BIA to
HEW. Id.
255. Hasse, supra note 26, at 247-48. Hasse also reports that "when land had to be
withdrawn from the tribal estate and sold, the tribes wanted to be given first opportunity to
buy it. But they had only limited finances and it was against bureau policy to make funds
available for such purposes. The bureau could make loans to individuals for land purchase
from revolving funds, but not to tribes for increasing their estates." Id.
256. Act of Aug. 9, 1955, Pub. L. No. 255, ch. 615, 69 Stat. 539 (codified at 25 U.S.C.
§ft 415-415d (1970). The act is discussed in Price & Chambers, Regulating Sovereignty:
Secretarial Discretion and the Leasing of Indian Lands, 26 STAN L. REV 1061, 1074-75
(1974).
257. 25 U.S.C. § 415.
258. There is no doubt about the need for reform of laws governing the leasing of In-
dian lands. One major problem was, and is, the fractionation of heirships resulting from
the General Allotment Act. Seegenerally Price & Chambers, supra note 256, especially at
1071-74.
259. 25 U.S.C. § 425a (1970).
260. 25 U.S.C. § 415c (1970).
261. Hasse, supra note 26, at 257. See generally, LA V. MADIGAN, THE AMERICAN
INDIAN RELOCATION PROGRAM (report for Association on American Indain Affairs, Inc.,
Dcember 1956).
262. See J. JORGENSON, THE SUN DANCE RELIGION: POWER FOR THE POWERLESS 125 (1972).
263. Id. at 125-27. See also D. McNICKEL. THEY CAME HERE FIRST 253 (rev. ed. 1975)
and the authorities cited in note 265, infra.
264. See, e.g., id. at 125. The most frequent alternative to returning to the reservation
was said to be suicide.
265. MADIGAN, supra note 261, at 18; TYLER, HISTORY supra note 6, 159; JORGENSON
supra note 262, at 125, 127.
266. MADIGAN; supra note 261, at 18; TYLER, HISTORY supra note 6, at 159.
267. Hasse, supra note 26, at 257.
268. Id. at 258.
269. Id. at 258-59. "An official at the Colville Reservation reported Indian feelings
there on relocation: 'They seem to feel that the program is a government means to move the
Indians from the reservation [to allow non-Indians] to exploit the reservation and eventual-
ly force all Indians from the reservation areas."'
270. Id. See BURNETTE. THE ROAD TO WOUNDED KNEE 18 (1974) (discussing the
"disaster'" of relocation). See generally TASK FORCE EIGHT. supra note 85, and the
aulhorities cited in note 265, supra.
271. JORGENSON. supra note 262, at 124.
272. See generally BROPHY & ABERLE. supra note 2. See note 85, supra.
273. TYLER. HISTORY. supra note 6, at 204... See Federal Indian Policy, Hearings on S,
809, S. Con. Res. 3, and 5. 331 Before the Subcomm. on Indian Affairs of the Senate
Comm. on Interior& InsularAffairs, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957).
274. See, e.g., Orfield, supra note 10, at ch. 3.
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275. See, e.g., Memorandum to Mr. Mitchell from Harold Borgstrom (Apr. 19,
1976)(The White House, Executive Office of the President, Office of Management and
Budget), reprinted in TASK FORCE TEN, supra note 10 at 1690-92 (discussing choice between
policies of forced termination and "influenc[ingi" Indian "perceptions and motives... to
change," in the context of self-determination, toward assimilation); Hearing on S. 282,
supra note 175, at 25-27, reprinted in CAHN supra note 47, at 20-21 (testimony of R. Ben-
nett, BIA Commissioner, regarding "gradual" termination of Indian tribes on a "group"
basis). See also Schmidhauser, The Struggle for Cultural Survival: The Fishing Rights of
the Treaty Tribes of the Pacific Northwest, 52 NOTRE DAME LAW. 30, 33, 36 (1976) (listing
state court decisions favoring non-Indian interests over Indian treaty rights); Finnigan,
Indian Treaty Analysis and Off-Reservation Fishing Rights: A Case Study,
276. Orfield, supra note 10, ch. 4 at 14.
277. Id.
278. See, e.g., the plans cited in note 127, supra.
279. Hasse, supra note 26, at 301.
280. E.g., Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-452 §603(a)(2), 78 Stat.
508 (1964) reprinted in [1964] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 585, 612. Programs under
the Kennedy Administration had made a beginning in this direction. E.g., Area Redevelop-
ment Act, Pub. L. No. 87-27, §5(b), 75 Stat. 47 (1961), reprinted in [1961] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS at 50, 52. See TYLER, HISTORY, supra note 6, at 205-206.
281. Telephone interview with Barry Ernstoff, Colville Tribal attorney, Mar. 31,
1977. See also V. DELORIA, CUSTER DIED FOR YOUR SINS 78-79, 82 (1969).
282. Josephy, The American Indian and the Bureau of Indian Affairs, a Study with
Recommendations (Feb. 11, 1969), reprinted in RED POWER 105-39 (H. Josephy ed. 1971).
283. E.g., S. REP. No. 501, supra note 239; Hearings on Indian Education, supra note
232, at 20. Cf. id. at 16 ("Indian students who come from the most unacculturated homes
succeeld] best in college.., because these people have a positive self-image and are not lost
between two worlds").
284. President's Message to Congress, The American Indians, 116 CONG. REC. 23131
(July 8, 1970).
285. Id.
286. Id.
287. Indian Self-Determination and Assistance Act, Hearings on S. 1017 Before the
Subcomm. on Indian Affairs of the Senate Comm. on Interior & Insular Affairs, 93d
Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
288. See generally, Hearings on S. 1017, supra note 287.
289. 25 U.S.C. §§ 903-903f (Supp. 1975).
290. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 604, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1973); H.R. REP No. 572, 93d
Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1973). The latter report noted that termination "has brought the
Menominee people to the brink of economic, social and cultural disaster." Id. See generally
FREEDOM WITH RESERVATION (D. Shames ed. 1972).
291. Menominee Restoration Act, Hearings on 5. 1687 Before the Subcomm. on In-
dian Affairs of the Senate Comm. on Interior &r Insular Affairs, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 288
(1973) [hereinafter cited as Senate Menominee Hearings].
292. Id.
293. Id. at 290.
294. Menominee Restoration Act, Hearings on H.R. 7421 Before the Subcomm. on In-
dian Affairs of the House Comm. on Interior & Insular Affairs, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 6
(1973) [hereinafter cited as House Menominee Hearings]: "'Termination, as a means of
fulfilling the obligations and commitments of the federal government to the Indians has,
beyond question, proven a failure. Termination, as a means of making the Indians first-
class citizens and confirming self-determination on the Indian people has, beyond question,
proven a disaster to the Indian tribes and people... [The BIA Report on the Menominee
Tribe] must stand as an effective indictment of termination as a national approach to Indian
affairs." See also, e.g., id. at 248-49.
295. Id. at 16, 265 ("I think if this legislation passes the word will truly go out across
the country that the policy.., of self-determination rather than termination is really more
than just words."
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296. Id. at 11, 250 (one objective of the bill "is to mark the repudiation of the termina-
tion policy of the U.S. Government. This latter objective may make H.R. 7421 the most
significant Indian legislation to come before the 93d Congress").
297. Senate Menominee Hearings, supra note 291, at 24-25 ("of all the past failures of
the federal government in its relationship with the American Indian, none has been more
obvious than the termination policy embodied in House Concurrent Resolution
108 .... This policy has worked a serious injustice to the American Indian people. As a
statement of national policy it is inaccurate and misleading").
298. Id. at 23 ("the fact is that the whole policy of termination has been set aside
now... ").
299. Id. at 27-28 ("The disillusion which has followed the policy of termination has
been a good thing. It has enabled us to see the reality behind the illusions. Now is the time
for us to acknowledge our mistake and take positive action to correct it").
300. Id. at I ("The present status of the Menominee illustrates the magnitude of the er-
ror perpetuated in the name of termination").
301. House Menominee Hearings, supra note 294, at 277 ("At the time it was first pro-
posed, termination was thought to be the answer to the 'Indian problem' in this country.
Today we know this not to be the case. Termination, like so many of the policies which
preceeded it, has proved to be-at least in the case of the Menominees-a bankrupt ap-
proach.").
302. Statement by the President [upon the signing of the Menominee Restoration Act],
Dec. 22, 1973 (copy on file with American Indian Law Review: "By restoring the
Menominee Indian Tribe to Federal trust status, the United States has at last made a clear
reversal of a policy which was wrong, the policy of forcibly terminating Indian tribal
status. I indicated my strong opposition to such termination in my Message to the Congress
of July 8, 1970. I continue to believe that the Congress should rescind the outmoded House
Concurrent Resolution 108 of 1953 in which this ill-advised termination policy was first set
forth.")
303. Pub. L. No. 93-638, 88 Stat. 2203 (1975).
304. Other recent legislation by Congress, especially during the Ninety-third Con-
gress, is discussed in Israel, The Reemergence of Tribal Nationalism and its Impact on
Reservation Resource Development, supra note 1, at 624-29.
305. Several terminated tribes have had restoration bills introduced. Senate hearings
have been held on the Siletz Restoration Act, which is expected to be passed during the
Ninety-fifth Congress. See Siletz Restoration Act, Hearings on S. 2801 Before the Sub-
comm. on Indian Affairs of the Senate Comm. on Interior & Insular Affairs, 94th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1976).
306. In Otradovec v. First Wisconsin Trust, 454 F.2d 1258, 1261 (7th Cir. 1972), the
Seventh Circuit held that Congress still had a "continued partial guardianship" over the af-
fairs of the Menominee Tribe. The same result was reached in regard to the Klamath Tribe
in Crain v. First Nat'l Bank, 324 F.2d 532, 536 (9th Cir. 1963). It would seem clear that Con-
gress could, in the proper exercise of its plenary power over all Indians, extend federal trust
status to various Indian tribes even if no federal-tribal relationship presently existed; Con-
gress' power over Indians extends to "all dependent Indian communities within the United
States' borders." United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28, 45 (1913). See also United States
v. Candelaria, 271 U.S. 432, 439 (1926). For other authorities on Congress' plenary power,
see', e.g., FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 1, at 95-96; Warren Trading Post v. Arizona Tax
Comm'n, 380 U.S. 685 (1965).
307. See notes 48-51, supra, and accompanying text. See also House Menominee
Hearings, supra note 294, at 313-23 (historical summary, by Vine Deloria, of early
"restorations").
308. The alternatives are discussed, and a proposed "American Indian Restoration
Act" is set out in draft form, in TASK FORCE TEN, supra note 10, at 1705-11.
309. That reappraisal seems already to have occurred, at least in the minds of many
leading congressmen. See, e.g., notes 294-302, and accompanying text. See generally, Part
III. supra. The upcoming Final Report of the American Indian Policy Review Commission
will adopt the recommendation of Task Force Ten that a comprehensive restoration policy
be adopted. See note 308, supra.
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